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SECRET ALGORITHMS, IP RIGHTS, AND 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Meghan J. Ryan* 
The secrecy surrounding the algorithms that play a central role in American 
life today is proving to have alarming effects. Judges and juries are convicting 
defendants based on secret evidence. Major advertisers like Facebook are dis-
criminating against minorities seeking housing. And Russians may very well be 
hacking our voting machines to change election outcomes. The algorithm secrecy 
underlying these results obscures whether such legal outcomes are actually accu-
rate and fair or whether they were based on faulty evidence, affected by bias, or 
manipulated by outside influences. These are just a handful of the public-interest 
perils of algorithm secrecy. This Article explains that the pervasive secrecy sur-
rounding algorithms is not entirely by accident. The Supreme Court’s recent 
overhaul of intellectual property (IP) law has driven algorithm developers to-
ward secrecy. By limiting patent protection for software, the Court’s new IP re-
gime pushes developers away from the required disclosure of patent law and to-
ward the obscurity of trade secret law. In doing so, the new regime neglects to 
take into account the many negative effects that this heightened secrecy has on 
the public interest. Accuracy, fairness, and good policy require a more careful 
consideration of the tradeoffs between secrecy and transparency. This includes 
not only exploring how to minimize these swelling public-interest concerns but 
also reexamining the Court’s new IP rules with these negative effects in mind. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judges and juries are convicting defendants based on secret evidence.1 Ma-
jor advertisers such as Facebook are discriminating against minorities seeking 
housing.2 And Russians may be hacking our voting machines to change elec-
tion outcomes.3 These are just some of the evils that have followed a burgeon-
ing secrecy ensconcing the algorithms that play such a central role in American 
life today.4 Transparency has an important role to play in ensuring the accuracy 
of these algorithms and the fairness of the outcomes they produce. But the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent change of course in intellectual property (IP) law now 
means that, where algorithm-based software is concerned, the law encourages 
trade secret protection over patent protection. This translates into encouraging 
algorithm secrecy over algorithm transparency. Considering the injustices that 
flow from this policy preference for trade secret over patent protection, howev-
er, courts really ought to consider the public-interest perils resulting from this 
decision. 
The recent landmark case of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank5 ushered in a new era 
of IP rights. This case, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a software pa-
 
1  See infra Section II.A. 
2  See infra Section II.B. 
3  See infra Section II.C. Please note that, although this Article does express concern about 
the security of our elections, is does not suggest that the 2020 presidential election was sto-
len, hacked, or produced fraudulent results.  
4  See generally Machine Bias: Investigating Algorithmic Injustice, PROPUBLICA, 
https://www.propublica.org/series/machine-bias [https://perma.cc/P697-4FLM] (investigat-
ing and reporting a series of stories on “algorithmic injustice and the formulas that influence 
our lives”). 
5  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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tent on the ground that abstract ideas such as algorithms cannot be patented,6 
left IP lawyers and their clients scrambling for how to deal with their proprie-
tary technologies. The prospects for successfully patenting software, computer-
ized algorithms, and other similar technologies are now dubious. And consider-
ing that the patent system is based on a tradeoff of surrendering secrecy for 
gaining a short-term monopoly on an idea,7 the loss of patent rights—or even 
just uncertainty about patent rights—has led to increased secrecy surrounding 
companies’ technologies. Understandably, if a company is unable to success-
fully patent its technology and obtain a short-term monopoly on the invention, 
the company will want to maintain the secrecy of the technology.8 Further, 
companies have an incentive to bolster that secrecy so that, even if they cannot 
obtain patent rights, they can secure trade secret rights on the technology.9 
In this milieu of uncertainty, there has been concern that the American 
framework for innovation is collapsing.10 If companies are not disclosing their 
 
6  See id. at 212 (“We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of interme-
diated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to trans-
form that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). 
7  See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (suggesting that the 
limited monopoly available under patent law is “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new 
knowledge”; that “grant[ing] an exclusive right to an invention [is] the creation of society—
at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and [i]s not to be freely given”; and 
that “[o]nly inventions and discoveries which further[] human knowledge, and [a]re new and 
useful, justif[y] the special inducement of a limited private monopoly”); see also Clarisa 
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626–27 (2002) (referring to this—“fram[ing] 
intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, as an exchange of information for 
protection”—as “[t]he simple view”); infra note 25. 
8  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 21–22 (1984) (explaining that program developers generally only make their pro-
grams available to the public if they are compensated). But see generally Long, supra note 7, 
at 627 (urging readers to “relax the assumption that the private value of a patent is based 
solely on the ability to capture rents and exclude others from using the invention”). 
9  See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2020) 
(“[F]ailure to use efforts reasonable under the circumstances to protect matter claimed to be 
a trade secret is necessarily fatal to the claim. . . . The value, then, of a trade secret rests in 
maintenance of secrecy.”); see also generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 
114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (creating a federal private cause of action for trade secret misappro-
priation); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 1985) (providing 
model rules for trade secret protection). 
10  See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (Moore, J., dissenting) (warning that “if all of these claims . . . are 
not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all 
business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer imple-
mented and telecommunications patents” and concluding that this “would decimate the elec-
tronics and software industries”); Brief for Paul R. Michel as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 9, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298) (ar-
guing that the Court in Alice should “return to its seminal precedent in Diehr, a computer 
case” and stating that following “the aberrational approach of Flook or the unworkable no-
tion of relative abstractness of Bilski will complicate, confuse, and confound the patent law” 
and “also cripple, if not destroy, computer-related industries, of which there are many and 
which are vital to the future of the country in today's highly competitive global economy.”); 
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technologies but are in fact strengthening the secrecy masking their technolo-
gies, then other inventors cannot build on the already-existing technologies. 
This slows innovation. The trajectory that we are set upon is troubling. 
The incentive for secrecy that Alice created has fueled an additional trou-
bling development in the domain of the public interest. As companies migrate 
from patent to trade secret protection and bolster the secrecy surrounding their 
new technologies, not only do these technologies become unavailable to the 
companies’ competitors, but they also become unavailable to the general public 
more broadly.11 This means that it is significantly more difficult to verify the 
important results these technologies produce by assessing the accuracy and 
fairness of their underlying algorithms. 
This is already playing out in the criminal justice arena. For example, crim-
inal defendants are often convicted by evidence such as breathalyzer results, 
fingerprint matches, and DNA analyses. These pieces of evidence are rooted in 
various computerized algorithms that have often been developed by independ-
ent technology companies and are ordinarily claimed as proprietary in nature.12 
From the perspective of the companies, this is perfectly understandable; they 
seek to profit off their investments in research and development. From the per-
spective of the criminal defendant, however, the proprietary—and thus secret—
nature of these computerized algorithms is unfair. Although such a claim of un-
fairness has been asserted by only a handful of criminal defendants,13 this is not 
because the secret nature of these computerized algorithms on which convic-
tions are based is not troubling; it is instead because, due to the sorry state of 
public funding for the assistance of counsel, many attorneys representing these 
defendants are not even aware that this is an issue.14 But it is an important is-
sue. Under the Constitution, criminal defendants must “be afforded a meaning-
ful opportunity to present a complete defense”15 and to “confront[] . . . the wit-
 
Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine 
Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 952 (2017) 
(“Like the Four Horsemen, Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice have cut through the innovation 
industries, striking down wide swaths of patent applications and issued patents.”); see also 
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 765, 776 (2018) (explaining that commentators “worry that the restriction of 
patent eligibility threatens innovation, particularly in the fields of biotechnology and medical 
diagnostics”). 
11  See infra text accompanying notes 31–34. 
12  See Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269, 303–05 
(2020). 
13  See id. at 306, 313, 319–20. 
14  See id. at 323–24 (suggesting that criminal justice actors lack the scientific and technolog-
ical knowledge to understand the nuances of algorithms and source codes and noting that the 
sorry state of public defense in this country often allows for these issues to be overlooked). 
15  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 
547 U.S. 319, 319 (2006) (“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 
(1986))); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an accused in a 
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nesses against [them].”16 Without access to the details of the computerized al-
gorithms providing incriminating evidence against them, these defendants lack 
the opportunity to challenge this incriminating evidence that poses real ques-
tions of accuracy, not to mention bias. 
These concerns of accuracy and bias, which stem from a lack of transpar-
ency and public access, are also popping up in areas such as housing and vot-
ing. For example, there are allegations that Facebook’s advertisement-targeting 
software discriminates against minorities in housing—a move that runs contra-
ry to the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 There is also ev-
idence indicating that the algorithms used in voting machines are vulnerable to 
outside manipulation, which threatens to undermine the foundations of our de-
mocracy.18 In these contexts, too, the walls of secrecy shield from public scru-
tiny the independently developed technologies on which private companies and 
the government are regularly relying. 
This troublesome clash between secrecy and transparency emerges from 
the increasing reliance on technology in legal decisionmaking and the compet-
ing interests of the technology developers, technology users, and general pub-
lic. The dynamics among these different populations vary depending on the 
technology, making it difficult to find a universally applicable solution. In 
some circumstances, making the algorithm available under seal or allowing it to 
be viewed in camera might satisfy the users and public clamoring for access 
while simultaneously addressing the developers’ primary concerns. Under other 
conditions, pushing the developers and users into exclusive license agreements 
that would mitigate the developers’ disclosure anxieties could be feasible. But 
in some situations, as in the voting context, transparency poses concerns in ad-
dition to the developers’ IP rights, such as security issues. Because each scenar-
io differs, attention must be paid to the various stakeholders and risks involved 
to find the appropriate balance of secrecy and transparency. A more universal 
approach might be possible, however, by reassessing the new rules of IP rights 
in play after Alice. If courts were to take into account these various public-
interest perils that flow from secrecy when they sketch the shifting boundaries 
of IP rights, many of these risks and harms could be avoided. 
This Article pinpoints the new regime of IP law as a significant contributor 
to the algorithm secrecy problem imperiling the public interest and advances a 
handful of approaches to minimize the negative effects flowing from the secre-
cy incentives created by Alice. Apart from this patchwork approach to mitigat-
ing the effects of algorithm secrecy, this Article suggests that courts should se-
riously consider the impacts on the public interest when charting the boundaries 
of IP protection, at least where software-related algorithm secrecy is involved. 
 
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against 
the State’s accusations.”). 
16  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
17  See infra Section II.B. 
18  See infra Section II.C. 
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Part I of this Article lays the foundation, explaining the basic tenets of IP law 
and chronicling how the Supreme Court has recently narrowed subject matter 
eligibility for patents where computerized algorithms are concerned, thus push-
ing software developers in the direction of protecting their inventions through 
trade secret law instead. Naturally, this results in greater secrecy ensconcing 
these algorithms. Part II describes how many of these algorithms affect our 
everyday lives and how keeping them secret can have a real impact in various 
public-interest arenas. For example, judges and juries are convicting criminal 
defendants based on the results these secret algorithms produce even though 
questions have arisen about the accuracy of these results.19 Further, companies 
such as Facebook rely on secret algorithms in their advertisement targeting, 
which could discriminate against certain types of individuals in critical markets 
like housing.20 And we rely on these secret algorithms in assessing the out-
comes of our elections even though, again, there are accuracy questions and, 
relatedly, questions about whether the algorithms have allowed for security 
breaches.21 Finally, Part III suggests that, in the interest of justice, we must 
strike a better balance between the needs for secrecy and transparency where 
the public interest is involved. The risks of secrecy and transparency differ de-
pending on the context, so it is necessary to carefully assess these risks in de-
termining the proper balance. Further, the problem of algorithm secrecy calls 
out for a broader solution that hearkens back to a significant contributor to the 
predicament: the new IP regime after Alice. In continuing to construct the 
boundaries of IP protections, courts ought to consider the public-interest im-
pacts that stem from their decisions. These legal and policy determinations 
should not be made with blinders on but should instead consider how secrecy 
and transparency will impact important public-interest areas. 
I. THE NEW RULES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Inventors have taken advantage of various IP protections for over a centu-
ry.22 Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and, somewhat later, trade secrets have 
traditionally occupied different territories, but software is unique in that it pos-
sesses characteristics that lend themselves to various types of IP protection. 
This has led to some uncertainty about how developers can best protect their 
 
19  See infra Section II.A. 
20  See infra Section II.B. 
21  See infra Section II.C. 
22  See William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum - ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die Ges-
chichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of Intellectual Property: 
A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in 130 EIGENTUM IM 
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265, 270 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999), https://cyber.harva 
rd.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC94-TWE5] (outlining the history of 
IP law in the United States); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law 
and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 498 (2010) (explaining that “the development of trade secret law in 
the United State[s] began in 1837”). 
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technologies. But this uncertainty was significantly magnified when the Su-
preme Court recently shook the foundations of IP law by severely limiting pa-
tent protection for software. This has pushed software developers to seek pro-
tection in trade secret law instead, which translates into a shift from disclosing 
the details of software to keeping them secret. 
A.  Foundations 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts.”23 Congress put this authority into action through a series of statutes 
preserving authors’ and inventors’ works via patent, copyright, trademark, and 
even trade secret protection.24 In large part, Congress has opted to promote sci-
entific and artistic progress through providing inventors and authors with a lim-
ited monopoly on their work in exchange for sharing their work with the com-
munity.25 For example, Title 35 of the U.S. Code states that, if an inventor 
discloses a new, useful, and nonobvious invention with sufficient particularity, 
and if he also pays the relevant fees to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO), then he is entitled to patent protection—a twenty-year term of exclusivi-
ty on his invention.26 Title 17 provides that, if an author creates an original 
 
23  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
24  See 17 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C §§ 1831–1839; 35 U.S.C., (laying out the definitions and bound-
aries of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (amending various parts of Title 35). 
25  See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (suggesting that the 
limited monopoly available under patent law is “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new 
knowledge”; that “grant[ing] . . . an exclusive right to an invention [is] the creation of socie-
ty—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and [is] not to be freely given”; 
and that “[o]nly inventions and discoveries which further[] human knowledge, and [a]re new 
and useful, justif[y] the special inducement of a limited private monopoly”); see also Long, 
supra note 7, at 626 (referring to this—“fram[ing] intellectual property in general, and pa-
tents in particular, as an exchange of information for protection”—as “[t]he simple view”). 
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court explained: 
The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the “Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.” As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a grant 
of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent 
monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize the issuance of patents whose effects 
are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.” 
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6). 
26  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to [certain] conditions . . . .”); id. § 103 (providing that, 
to obtain such a patent, though, the invention must be new, useful, and nonobvious “to a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”); id. §§ 111–12 
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work fixed in a tangible form, he is entitled to copyright protection, which 
amounts to exclusivity of his work for the duration of his life plus seventy years 
thereafter.27 Moreover, if the author goes through the steps to register his copy-
right, he is entitled to additional protections amounting to the ability to sue for 
infringement, potentially obtain an injunction, and recover an array of damages 
and attorneys’ fees.28 Constitutional bargains like these benefit inventors and 
artists by allowing them to profit from exclusivity, and they simultaneously 
benefit society by allowing its members access to these inventions and arts.29 
Society can simply consume this wealth of information or even build upon it, 
further fueling scientific and artistic progress.30 
Trade secret law complements these patent and copyright protections. But 
trade secret law is in some ways the exact opposite in that it protects secrets—
disclosure is not required, and in fact disclosure inhibits the ability to protect 
the IP at issue.31 Pursuant to this corner of IP law, one may to a certain extent 
 
(providing that a patent application should include a “specification . . . contain[ing] a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and . . . set[ting] 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the inven-
tion”); id. § 154 (“Subject to the payment of fees . . . [the] grant [of a patent] shall be for a 
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on 
which the application for the patent was filed . . . .”). 
27  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in orig-
inal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); id. § 302 (“Copyright in a work creat-
ed on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the fol-
lowing subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after 
the author’s death.”). 
28  See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 401[C] (5th ed. Supp. 
2020). An author may not file an infringement suit unless he first registers the copyright. See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 411–412; EPSTEIN, supra, at § 401[C]. Note, however, that different rules apply 
if the work originated outside the United States. See EPSTEIN, supra, at § 401[C]. Although 
an author may bring claims based on infringements even prior to registration, such an author 
is not entitled to the full panoply of remedies that an author suing on infringements subse-
quent to registration is entitled. See id. (“In addition to prohibiting the institution of an in-
fringement suit until after registration, the [Copyright] Act conditions the remedies of statu-
tory damages and attorneys’ fees on having registered the copyright before infringement.” 
(footnotes omitted)). The author of a work not registered at the time of infringement may be 
entitled to an injunction and actual damages, but the author of a registered work may also be 
entitled to statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. See id. Where published works are con-
cerned, the statute provides a three-month grace period. See id. 
29  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
30  See supra note 25. 
31  See Orly Lobel, Filing for a Patent Versus Keeping Your Invention a Trade Secret, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/filing-for-a-patent-versus-keeping-your-
invention-a-trade-secret [https://perma.cc/3MNQ-QAUF] (“Patents and trade secrets present 
opposing choices. Trade secrets derive their legal protection from their inherently secret na-
ture. Patents, by contrast, can only be protected through public disclosure.”); see also 2 
MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 9, at § 9.02[2][a] (“Trade secret law is pertinent to patent 
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protect his invention or special knowledge if it constitutes a “trade secret,” 
meaning that the individual has taken reasonable measures to maintain the se-
crecy of information that derives economic value from its secrecy.32 Although 
trade secret law does not provide as robust protection as patent or copyright 
law, it does provide some protection against the misappropriation of that trade 
secret. If another misappropriates the trade secret—discovering it directly or 
indirectly “by improper means,” or disclosing it in breach of the trade secret 
 
licensing because it provides an independent, complementary form of industrial property 
which in some instances offers alternative protective umbrellas for patentable technology 
and, in others, may together serve to protect subject matter that is the same or closely related 
to patented matter.”). Professors Sharon Sandeen and Ulla-Maija Mylly have explained: 
As with . . . IP . . . laws more generally, the theory underlying trade secret protection is that soci-
ety gets something that is of greater benefit than the advantages that flow from information dif-
fusion and free competition. In the case of trade secrets, this includes the prevention of unfair 
competition and additional incentives for invention and creation over and above what is provid-
ed by patent and copyright laws. 
Sharon K. Sandeen & Ulla-Maija Mylly, Trade Secrets and the Right to Information: A 
Comparative Analysis of E.U. and U.S. Approaches to Freedom of Expression and Whistle-
blowing, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2020). There is a dark side to trade secret law, though. It 
has been used to hide facts like the dangerousness of pesticides and cigarettes. See FRANK 
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND 
INFORMATION 12 (2015). 
32  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–36); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) (UNIF. 
L. COMM’N, amended 1985). The Defend Trade Secrets Act provides: 
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physical-
ly, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if– 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another per-
son who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Restatement (First) of Torts, and Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition define “trade secret” in much the same way. See 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1979, amended 1985) (“ ‘Trade 
secret’ ” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that . . . (i) derives independent economic value, actual or po-
tential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and . . . (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939) (“A trade 
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation 
of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actu-
al or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
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holder’s confidence—trade secret law provides certain limited remedies.33 
Once the information has been made public, though, there is little that can be 
done to mitigate the resulting damages. Individuals and entities that learn of the 
information without engaging in inappropriate behaviors themselves are free to 
use the information, draining the value of the secret for the original trade secret 
holder. Indeed, “[a] trade secret once lost is . . . lost forever.”34 
The various categories of IP have traditionally been siloed under the law. 
One’s disclosed work could be categorized as falling into the patent, copyright, 
or trademark categories, or one could opt to maintain the secrecy of his work. 
This choice between secrecy and disclosure often amounts to a choice between 
patent and trade secret protection, though.35 With respect to copyright and 
trademark protections, there is little reason to choose secrecy because it is often 
difficult to monetize one’s work without disclosure in these instances. 
The choice between the disclosure of patent law and the concealment of 
trade secret law can sometimes be a difficult one. Numerous considerations af-
fect whether businesses pursue patent protection or seek to preserve trade se-
 
33  See 18 U.S.C. § 1839; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1979) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
amended 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. L. INST. 1939). The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
provides: 
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or service used in 
or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other 
than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that 
trade secret, knowingly– 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, 
artifice, or deception obtains such information; 
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, up-
loads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communi-
cates, or conveys such information; 
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or 
appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; 
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or 
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs 
(1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspir-
acy, 
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
10 years, or both. 
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not 
more than the greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret to the organi-
zation, including expenses for research and design and other costs of reproducing the trade secret 
that the organization has thereby avoided. 
18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
34  FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curi-
am). 
35  Orly Lobel has helpfully explained that “trade secret law and patent law can coexist,” 
though, and that, within a particular client’s portfolio, a patent might “protect the broad con-
cept, while trade secret[] [might] protect the production details.” Lobel, supra note 31. 
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crets on any of their inventions. Some factors that one might consider in choos-
ing the best category include the following:36 
1.  Whether the invention actually qualifies for patent protection;37 
2.  The limited duration of a patent—today only twenty years—compared 
to the potential perpetuity of a trade secret;38 
3.  The life-cycle of the invention—whether the typical twenty-four-
month time period for obtaining a patent exceeds the amount of time 
there will be demand for the product on the market;39 
4.  The high price of obtaining a patent, including the costs of retaining 
legal assistance and the fees owed to the PTO, compared to the relative 
affordability of maintaining a trade secret;40 
5.  The risk of trade secret misappropriation and disclosure of the secret to 
the public;41 
6.  The risk that a trade secret will be exposed through legal means, such 
as through independent invention or reverse-engineering, and thus lose 
its trade secret protection;42 
 
36  “[B]ecause this choice is frequently encountered in the real world, academics and practi-
tioners have developed a well-established body of literature describing the considerations 
that should be taken into account when deciding between patent and trade secret protection.” 
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 637 
(2013). Some additional considerations include “business concerns, antitrust issues, and in-
dustry-specific cultural views of patents.” David Hricik, Will Patenting Make as Much Sense 
in the New Regime of Weakened Patent Rights and Shorter Product Life Cycles?, 20 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 506 (2017). For a more robust discussion of relevant factors, see 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Pro-
tection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380–406 
(2002). 
37  See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 636 (“[B]ecause the scope of trade secret law is much 
broader than that of patent law, some valuable information—like a customer list or a market-
ing strategy—may qualify as a trade secret but be ineligible for patent protection.”). 
38  See id. at 630 (“[O]nce the [trade] secret is disclosed, it is lost forever. On the other hand, 
if the secret is kept, trade secret law offers protection in perpetuity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Often, “[t]he duration of an IP right is among its most important characteristics . . . .” Id. at 
637. Accordingly, Andrew Schwartz has argued that corporations should generally prefer 
trade secrets over patents so that the corporations—“perpetual entities”—may 
“reap . . . perpetual returns that only a trade secret can offer.” Id. at 623, 649. 
39  See Hricik, supra note 36, at 498–506. 
40  See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 644–46 (“The conventional analysis teaches that cost is a 
key concern when it comes to choosing between patent and trade secret protection. This in-
cludes both the cost of obtaining IP protection, and the cost of maintaining that protection, 
including through litigation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
41  See FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (“A trade secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.”); see also David S. Levine & 
Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 780 
(2018) (“It is notable that, in at least one study, the risk of departing employees misappropri-
ating trade secrets did not appear to justify using patents instead of trade secrecy and other 
mechanisms.”). 
42  See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 639–40. Contributors to this risk might include whether 
the product is “regularly observed in public settings” and whether “the invention [is] detect-
able and embedded in the product itself or is [] part of an internal manufacturing process[.]” 
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7.  The “signal value” that patents provide to third parties;43 and 
8.  The extent to which patent protection will enhance the liquidity and al-
ienability of the information.44 
One challenge is that, because of various unknowns, it is often difficult to de-
termine ex ante the type of protection that will prove best for any particular in-
vention or client. 
B. The Complexity of Software 
The complexity of the question as to how best protect one’s inventions and 
valuable information has grown as rapidly advancing technology, especially in 
areas related to computing, has overtaken our world. During the software boom 
in the 1970s and 1980s, software developers generally protected their products 
as trade secrets.45 This may have resulted from the uncertainty of seeking other 
forms of protection.46 Over time, though, these developers sought other, more 
robust, forms of protection for their inventions and thus turned to copyright and 
patent law.47 This shift highlighted some tensions among the various forms of 
IP protection. Through the lens of IP law, computer software is a “hybrid” 
product: Software is expressed in a written form, similar to a manuscript de-
serving of copyright protection, but software is functional in nature, which is 
similar to an invention ripe for patent protection.48 This blend of characteristics 
has raised significant questions about the proper, or most successful, vehicle for 
 
Lobel, supra note 31. Some commentators consider the risks of independent invention and 
reverse-engineering as part of the duration analysis. See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 637–40. 
43  Schwartz, supra note 36, at 641–42 (“The possession of a patent—any patent—conveys a 
strong positive ‘signal’ to outsiders, regardless of the technical merit of the actual inven-
tion.”). See generally Long, supra note 7 (emphasizing the signaling value of patents). “Fur-
ther, patents may be useful for building a portfolio of intellectual property assets, which 
firms can trade (e.g., by cross-licensing agreements) if a competitor asserts a patent against 
them.” Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1774 (2011). 
44  See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 643–45. As Andrew Schwartz explained: 
Both patents and trade secrets may be sold, licensed, or otherwise alienated. Patent, however, 
has a clear advantage over trade secrecy in that a patent is much easier, cheaper and less risky to 
alienate than a trade secret. This also makes a patent a more liquid asset than a trade secret. 
Id. at 643. 
45  See Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for 
Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2652 (1994) (noting that the software industry 
“developed principally through trade secret protection”). 
46  See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG: 
A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 107–08 (2003) (noting the uncertainty of patent pro-
tection and the usefulness of trade secret protection in the early days of software develop-
ment); Menell, supra note 45, at 2652 (noting the early usefulness of trade secret law). 
47  See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2. 
48  Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret 
Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 151, 151 (1987) (“In intellectual property terms, 
software is a true hybrid. . . . It is the hybrid nature of software that causes its failure to fit 
neatly into any one existing category of intellectual property, resulting in seemingly endless 
confusion as to how it may best be protected.”). 
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protection. Although there were a lot of bumps and bruises along the way, by 
the mid-1990s, software developers had generally found a way to “muddl[e] 
through” the difficulties of seeking patent and copyright protection for soft-
ware.49 
1. Copyrights 
The Copyright Act provides protection for a “computer program”—“a set 
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in 
order to bring about a certain result.”50 Under § 102, copyright protection is re-
served for expressive material, though.51 The statute specifically excludes from 
protection “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.”52 With respect to software, the legislative history of 
the Copyright Act makes clear that “the expression adopted by the programmer 
is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual pro-
cesses or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope 
of the copyright law.”53 
Despite the statute directly addressing computer programs, there has been 
some historical uncertainty about the scope of protection for software under the 
statute. Software does not fall squarely within traditional copyright subject mat-
ter like literary manuscripts; it is instead mostly functional in nature even 
though it is expressed in text through source and object code.54 Separating these 
distinct facets of software can be difficult, and this is exacerbated by the fact 
that judges ordinarily lack the technical expertise to clearly and competently 
separate the functional elements of software—which would be more appropri-
 
49  Menell, supra note 45, at 2652. Commenting on the state of IP protection for software in 
1994, Peter Menell stated: 
After many years of confusion, the existing legal regime appears to be muddling through. In the 
view of most commentators, the recent Altai and Sega decisions have correctly resolved two of 
the three major problems that have plagued copyright protection for software. The Lotus case, 
which presents the scope of copyright protection for user interfaces, could potentially resolve the 
last major difficulty inherent in the application of copyright law to computer software. Patent 
protection for software may prove to be problematic, although the extent of problems to date has 
been modest. 
Id. at 2652–53 (footnotes omitted). 
50  17 U.S.C. § 101; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (outlining some limitations on copyright pro-
tection where computer programs are at issue). 
51  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
52  Id. at § 102(b). 
53  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976). 
54  See Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of 
Patents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 243, 295–96 (2019). 
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ately protected under patent law—from the expressive aspects of software—
which would be more appropriately protected under copyright law.55 
It has generally been uncontroversial that copyright protects against the lit-
eral infringement of source and object code.56 This protection, however, is lim-
ited to the extent that computer programmers can reverse-engineer a program 
and author new code to achieve the same function with relative ease.57 Thus, 
the breadth of copyright protection in nonliteral infringement cases is im-
portant, and, perhaps not surprisingly, it has been more difficult to ascertain in 
these types of cases.58 
One area where there has been uncertainty about the scope of copyright 
protection is related to the “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) of 
computer programs, as well as programs’ “look and feel.”59 Initially, the Third 
Circuit determined that a program having an overall similar function and struc-
ture infringed the pre-existing program.60 Comparing software to other literary 
works, the court explained that “copyrights of other literary works can be in-
fringed even when there is no substantial similarity between the works’ literal 
elements.”61 Six years later, the Second Circuit rejected this approach and sig-
nificantly limited copyright protection for software.62 The court set forth a 
three-part test to determine whether a software copyright has been infringed: 
The first step involves constructing a hierarchy of abstractions, from most ab-
stract to most detailed, for the plaintiff’s program. The second step involves fil-
tering out from the analysis various elements of the program that are beyond the 
scope of copyright protection. The third step involves comparing any remaining 
“golden nuggets” of expression in the plaintiff’s program with the defendant’s 
 
55  See id. 
56  See id. (“Over the past several decades, the only easily resolved software copyright cases 
have been those in which plaintiffs proved that defendants literally infringed source or object 
code or copied videogame audiovisuals or other expressive screen displays generated by 
programs.”); Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1748 (“[N]o one seriously questioned that source 
code forms of programs could be copyrighted as written texts . . . .”). 
57  See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1752 (noting that, “[i]f programmers could easily re-
write code, and thereby avoid infringement of the first developer’s copyright, then little 
would be gained by the extension of copyright protection to programs”). But cf. Samuelson, 
supra note 54, at 295 (“Copyright provides very meaningful protection to these elements of 
programs.”). 
58  See Samuelson, supra note 54, at 295 (“Nonliteral infringement claims have proven much 
more difficult for courts to resolve . . . .”). 
59  See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1765–71. 
60  See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab’y, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the 
programs’ literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization, and (2) the district 
court’s finding of substantial similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom programs was 
not clearly erroneous.”); see also Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1765–66 (summarizing the 
Whelan decision). 
61  Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234. 
62  See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e 
think that [the district court judge] wisely declined to follow Whelan.”). 
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program to determine if the defendant copied substantial amounts of expression 
from the plaintiff’s program.63 
“Thin[ning]” out copyright protection in this way, the court suggested that 
Congress could provide additional copyright protection for software if desira-
ble.64 Following the Second Circuit’s analysis in this case, courts have further 
constrained copyright protection for software.65 
Another area where there has been uncertainty about the scope of copyright 
protection is related to reverse-engineering.66 Does creating copies—either ex-
act or very similar—of source or object code for the purpose of investigating 
the program’s function and recreating parts of the program using different code 
to achieve interoperability constitute fair use?67 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that this was indeed fair use.68 In deciding this, the court built on the 
Second Circuit’s understanding of software as “utilitarian works that were eli-
gible for only thin copyright protection.”69 It explained that, “[i]n order to enjoy 
a lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a work, the 
creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the 
patent laws.”70 
Although the uncertainty about the applicability of copyright law to soft-
ware reigned until the early 1990s, after these cases, it became clear that copy-
right protection as applied to software would be quite limited.71 This pushed 
software developers to seek protection elsewhere, namely in the realm of patent 
law.72 
 
63  Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1770 (footnotes omitted); see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 706–
10. 
64  See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1771; see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 712 (“[N]ow that more 
than 12 years have passed since CONTU issued its final report, the resolution of this specific 
issue could benefit from further legislative investigation—perhaps a CONTU II.”). 
65  See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1771 (“After Altai, courts became more openly skeptical 
about claims of copyright protection for the ‘look and feel’ of programs, as such claims typi-
cally sought to protect the now unprotected utilitarian aspects of programs.”). 
66  See id. at 1772. 
67  See id. (“Closely related to the SSO-in-interfaces controversy resolved in Altai was 
whether making copies of program code for the purpose of gaining access to information 
necessary to achieve interoperability was fair use.”). 
68  See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Where there is 
good reason for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted computer 
program, disassembly for purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”); see 
also Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1772. 
69  Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1772; see also Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520–27. 
70  Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526. 
71  See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1773. 
72  See id. (“The ‘thinness’ of copyright protection for programs after Altai and Sega seems 
to have contributed to a shift among software developers away from heavy reliance on copy-
right protection for program SSO and toward a greater reliance on patents.”). 
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2. Patents 
 At the dawn of the software revolution, the PTO seemed open to the pa-
tentability of software.73 As software boomed, pressure mounted regarding the 
need to address whether software indeed constitutes patentable subject matter.74 
In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a committee to study the 
matter, and the committee overwhelmingly concluded that software should not 
be patentable.75 Following this lead, the PTO issued a set of guidelines advising 
that the patentability of software would be severely limited.76 The PTO’s stated 
reason was that software is just the automation of “mental steps,” which are 
unpatentable in nature.77 
In the following decade, the Supreme Court decided a handful of cases ex-
plaining the limitations on patenting software. Section 101 of the Patent Act 
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to [other] conditions and re-
quirements of th[e] [Act].”78 Although this provision articulating the scope of 
patentable subject matter seems quite broad, the Court has historically held that 
there are three exceptions to this permissive language:79 
[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patenta-
ble. . . . Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.” . . . “Phenomena of nature, though just discov-
ered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as 
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” . . . And monopo-
lization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innova-
tion more than it would tend to promote it.80 
The Court explained that, although “all inventions at some level embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ide-
 
73  See Steven G. Steger, The Long and Winding Road to Greater Certainty in Software Pa-
tents, CBA REC., Apr. 2000, at 46, 47–48 (explaining that, “[i]n the early days of computer 
software development, the PTO had seemed receptive to the idea of patenting properly 
claimed software-related inventions”). 
74  See id. at 48. 
75  See id. 
76  See id. 
77  See id. 
78  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
79  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“ ‘We have long held that 
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable.’ . . . We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in 
light of this exception for more than 150 years.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ass’n 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013))); Mayo Collabora-
tive Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (“The Court has long held 
that this [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception.”). 
80  Prometheus Lab’ys., Inc., 566 U.S. at 70–71 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), and Gottschalk v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972)). 
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as,” allowing patents on the most basic of concepts would wholly preempt pro-
gress.81 
The Court first applied the exceptions to computer software in Gottschalk 
v. Benson,82 where the Court examined the patentability of “a method of pro-
gramming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-
coded decimal form into pure binary form.”83 The algorithm could “be carried 
out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary,” and 
it could “also be performed without a computer.”84 In its analysis, the Court re-
lied on its § 101 exception that “an idea of itself is not patentable”85 and clari-
fied that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”86 It explained that, in determining whether 
the invention amounts to something more than a simple, unpatentable algo-
rithm, it is relevant whether the invention includes a particular machine or 
transformation.87 Because the “mathematical formula involved here ha[d] no 
substantial practical application except in connection with a digital comput-
er, . . . [a] patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in prac-
tical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”88 Accordingly, the Court 
determined that the software could not be patented.89 
Several years later, in Parker v. Flook,90 the Court assessed the patentabil-
ity of a “Method for Updating Alarm Limits.”91 In determining that the soft-
ware at issue could not be patented,92 the Court reiterated that disembodied al-
gorithms are unpatentable and that patents are warranted on algorithm-based 
 
81  Id. at 71 (“The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this ex-
clusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, 
use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). 
82  Benson, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 67 (1972). 
83  Id. at 65. 
84  Id. at 67. 
85  Id. at 67 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 
(1974)). The Court explained: “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an origi-
nal cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclu-
sive right.” Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1852)). 
86  Id. 
87  See id. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is 
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”). 
The Court noted, however, that it was “not hold[ing] that no process patent could ever quali-
fy [for patentability] if it did not meet the requirements of [the machine-or-transformation 
test].” Id. at 71. 
88  Id. at 71–72. 
89  See id. at 72–73. 
90  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
91  Id. at 585. 
92  The Court explained that “all that [the patent application] provide[d] [was] a formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit.” Id. at 586, 594. 
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inventions only if those inventions, themselves, are “new and useful.”93 Con-
trasting his claim to that in Benson, the inventor explained that granting the pa-
tent here would not wholly preempt the mathematical formula and that certain 
“ ‘post-solution’ activity—the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure com-
puted according to the formula—distinguishe[d] [his] case from Benson and 
ma[de] his process patentable.”94 The Court disagreed, however, explaining that 
“[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious 
in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process ex-
alts form over substance.”95 
Then, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time that 
computer software could be patented.96 In that case, Diamond v. Diehr,97 the 
Court cut back somewhat on Benson and Flook. The Diehr Court found the 
software at issue patentable because, although “several steps of the process 
[employed] a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer,” it 
“[could not] be disputed” that the patent “claims involve[d] the transformation 
of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state.”98 
After Diehr, then, software that relied on underlying algorithms could be pa-
tented so long as it was paired with a physical step, even if that physical step 
was not new and was instead already known in the art.99 This case thus opened 
the door to the patentability of software. 
 
93  Id. at 591 (“Mackay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis for this case: the 
process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.”). Interest-
ingly, the Court made clear that its focus on the newness and usefulness of the invention 
were questions of patentable subject matter under § 101 rather than questions of novelty un-
der § 102 and obviousness under § 103. See id. at 588 (“This case turns entirely on the prop-
er construction of § 101 . . . which describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent pro-
tection. It does not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise 
under §§ 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is challenged.” (footnote omitted)). 
94  Id. at 590. 
95  Id. 
96  See Lionel M. Lavenue, Database Rights and Technical Data Rights: The Expansion of 
Intellectual Property for the Protection of Databases, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) 
(“In the 1981 case of in Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court, for the first time, found com-
puter software patentable.” (footnote omitted)); Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Own-
ership and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2009) (“In the 1981 
decision Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court gave its first clear indication that certain 
types of software-implemented inventions were patentable.” (footnote omitted)); Dana A. 
Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1713 n.109 
(2014) (“In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court’s first approval of software patentability oc-
curred in Diamond v. Diehr . . . .”). 
97  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
98  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. 
99  See id. at 187; Brieanna Dolmage, The Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter in the 
United States, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2006) (“The Court's decision in Diehr dis-
tinguished cases that sought to patent computer software using mathematical algorithms in 
conjunction with an additional physical step, even where the step was previously known in 
the art.”). Although the Court had previously “resisted the patenting of software programs, 
primarily on the ground that they constituted ‘mathematical algorithms,’ ” in Diehr the 
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 Following Diehr, the Supreme Court did not address the question of the ex-
tent that software is patentable until 2014,100 but, in the intervening thirty-three 
years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit gradually expanded the pa-
tentability of software.101 It first applied a test to assess whether software is pa-
tentable, examining whether the claim preempted the algorithm entirely or ap-
plied the algorithm to physical elements or processes that, themselves, 
constituted patentable subject matter.102 Then, in 1994, the Federal Circuit 
abandoned this test and narrowed the limitation on patenting software.103 In In 
re Alappat,104 the Federal Circuit examined the patentability of an invention 
that smoothed out an oscilloscope display by manipulating pixel intensities 
based on their locations in the display.105 It found that the Diehr Court did not 
intend to create a broad categorical exception to patentable subject matter for 
software.106 Instead, the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he plain and 
unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may be patented if it meets the [other] requirements” in the Patent 
Act.107 Indeed, in the 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,108 the Supreme 
Court had stated that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun 
that is made by man.”109 Referring back to Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Fed-
eral Circuit explained that these seemingly limiting decisions simply clarified 
 
“Court signaled a slight weakening in this resolve, upholding the patent on a software pro-
gram (embedded in a computer) that served to monitor continuously the temperature inside a 
synthetic rubber mold.” Fisher, supra note 22, at 270. 
100  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (returning to the question of sub-
ject matter eligibility in a software case). 
101  See Dolmage, supra note 99, at 1030–35; Fisher, supra note 22, at 270 (explaining that, 
after Diehr, “the Federal Circuit . . . adopted an increasingly receptive posture” toward con-
sidering software to be patentable). 
102  See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245–47 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“Determination 
of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter as a whole . . . requires a two-step 
analysis. First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an ‘algo-
rithm’ . . . . Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it 
wholly preempts that algorithm.”); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“This test, in its final form, had two steps: (1) determining whether the claim recites an ‘al-
gorithm’ within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is ‘ap-
plied in any manner to physical elements or process steps.’ ” (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 
at 95–107)), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
103  See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
104  Id. at 1526. 
105  See id. at 1537. 
106  See id. at 1543, 1543 n.20 (“A close analysis of Diehr, Flook, and Benson reveals that the 
Supreme Court never intended to create an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter 
excluded from § 101.”). 
107  Id. at 1542 (emphasis added). 
108  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
109  Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)); see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
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“a rather straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical 
subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until 
reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is 
not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.”110 Although a claim 
consisting entirely of a mathematical algorithm is unpatentable, an invention is 
not unpatentable simply because it contains such an algorithm, the court 
explained.111 If a claim includes something more than just an algorithm or other 
vague mathematical concept, then it would not be subject to the exceptions 
outlined in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.112 With respect to the invention at issue 
in In re Alappat, the court explained that the combination of elements 
“form[ed] a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples into anti-
aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means.”113 
“This,” the court explained, was “not a disembodied mathematical concept 
which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine 
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”114 Accordingly, it 
constituted, patentable subject matter.115 In other words, when the inventor 
claimed the algorithm in conjunction with a computer so that it could be 
applied in a practical way, the invention constitued a patentable “machine” 
under § 101.116 
The Federal Circuit continued welcoming software into the world of 
patentability when it decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc.117 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.118 a 
 
110  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
111  See id. at 1543–44. The court stated: 
It is . . . not necessary to determine whether a claim contains, as merely a part of the whole, any 
mathematical subject matter which standing alone would not be entitled to patent protection. In-
deed, because the dispositive inquiry is whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory sub-
ject matter, it is irrelevant that a claim may contain, as part of the whole, subject matter which 
would not be patentable by itself. “A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not 
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, mathematical equation, 
mathematical algorithm, computer program or digital computer.” 
Id. (emphasis, alterations, and footnote omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
187 (1981)). 
112  See id. at 1544. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  See id. at 1544–45. 
116  See id. (stating that “a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable 
subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other re-
quirements of Title 35” and finding that the claimed invention did not constitute “a disem-
bodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a 
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result”); Steger, supra note 73, 
at 50. As Steven Steger explained, “[a] software program running on a general purpose com-
puter creates a new machine because the general purpose computer becomes a special pur-
pose computer when performing according to instructions received from the program.” Id. 
117  State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc.,149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
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few years later. In these cases, the Federal Circuit made clear that software 
does indeed constitute patentable subject matter. In State Street, the court 
explained that only abstract, “disembodied” mathematical algorithms fall into 
the algorithm exception to patentability.119 When a computer transforms data 
through mathematical formulas and techniques and produces “a useful, 
concrete and tangible result,” the exception does not apply.120 In AT&T, the 
court doubled down, reiterating that the “inquiry . . . focuses on whether the 
mathematical algorithm is applied in a practical manner to produce a useful 
result.”121 More explicitly, the court explained that it was “now clear that 
computer-based programming constitutes patentable subject matter so long as 
the basic requirements of § 101 are met.”122 The Federal Circuit could not have 
been clearer, and this line of cases established stable footing for the 
patentability of computer software. In fact, following these cases, it was 
understood that “virtually any software program (if novel, nonobvious, etc.) 
[was] patentable, so long as the applicant describe[d] it as being programmed 
into a general purpose computer.”123 Perhaps not unexpectedly, these decisions 
resulted in “an enormous surge in software patent applications.”124 
C.  From Patents to Trade Secrets 
Beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases drastically 
shrinking the area of patentable subject matter. In Bilski v. Kappos,125 the Court 
assessed the patentability of a method for hedging risk—a common economic 
practice in industry.126 The Court’s confusing127 opinion first explained that the 
“machine-or-transformation” test as articulated in Benson cannot be the sole 
test for assessing whether something constitutes a “process” under § 101;128 in-
 
118  AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
119  State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1373–75. 
120  Id. at 1373. 
121  AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1360. 
122  Id. 
123  Fisher, supra note 22, at 270; see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise 
of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-out” Programs, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1153–63 (1995) (“In effect, then, Alappat establishes that a mathematical 
algorithm becomes patentable subject matter merely by virtue of its being programmed into 
a general purpose computer.”). 
124  Fisher, supra note 22, at 270. 
125  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
126  See id. at 611. 
127  See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the 
Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Pa-
tent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1304 (2011) (suggesting that 
the Bilski opinion is confusing); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 647 n.43 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the Bilski majority “illogically expanded the canon upon which it relie[d] 
beyond that canon’s logical underpinnings”). 
128  See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603 (“Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test 
for what constitutes a ‘process’ . . . violates . . . statutory interpretation principles.”). 
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stead, it is just “a useful and important clue” as to whether the invention in 
question is a process.129 Still, the Court concluded that the method was not a 
patentable “process” under § 101 because it was an “abstract idea”—falling 
under the § 101 exception to patentable subject matter.130 
Two years later, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laborato-
ries, Inc.,131 the Court again addressed the categorical exceptions to § 101—
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”132 It examined the 
patentability of “[a] method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,” which included “administering 
a drug[,] . . . determining the level of [the drug in the patient],” and assessing 
whether the drug level is too high or low based on the inventors’ research find-
ings.133 The Court determined that the method “set forth laws of nature—
namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the 
blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a . . . drug will prove ineffective or 
cause harm.”134 And the claimed “steps [were] not sufficient to transform un-
patentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regulari-
ties.”135 In reaching this conclusion, the Court took a tour through the Court’s 
§ 101 exception cases, including Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski.136 Notably, 
the Prometheus Court explained that, in Benson, the Court had “held that simp-
ly implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely, a 
computer, was not a patentable application of that principle. For the mathemat-
ical formula had ‘no substantial practical application except in connection with 
a digital computer.’ ”137 
 
129  See id. at 604 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test 
is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed 
inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test 
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’ ”). The Court further ex-
plained that business methods are not categorically unpatentable under § 101. See id. at 606 
(“Section 101 . . . precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ categorically ex-
cludes business methods.”). 
130  See id. at 609. 
131  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
132  Id. at 70 (alterations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
133  Id. at 74–75. 
134  Id. at 77. 
135  Id. at 80. 
136  See id. at 70–73, 78–82, 85. 
137  Id. at 84–85 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). The next year, in 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013), the 
Court found that “a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)” that was 
“isolate[ed] from the rest of the genome” was not patentable because it was a naturally oc-
curring phenomenon but that “synthetically created . . . complementary DNA . . . which con-
tains the same protein-coding information found in a segment of natural DNA but omits por-
tions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins” was patentable under § 101. Id. 
at 580. 
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Finally, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Court applied these 
revitalizations of the § 101 exception to computer software.138 As the Court ex-
plained, “[t]he patents at issue in th[e] case disclose[d] a computer-
implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ (i.e., the risk that only one 
party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party in-
termediary.”139 The Alice Court clarified the approach it set out earlier in Pro-
metheus, examining, first, whether the inventor’s claim was “directed to one of 
th[e] patent-ineligible concepts” such as algorithms and, second, whether the 
combination of claims transformed the invention “into a patent-eligible 
application”—whether there was an “inventive concept.”140 This approach is 
again based on the concern of placing a monopoly on a basic principle and 
stunting innovation.141 Then, relying heavily on Prometheus and Bilski, the 
Court concluded that the claims were “drawn to the abstract idea of intermedi-
ated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation 
fail[ed] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”142 More 
specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he introduction of a computer into the 
claims does not alter the analysis . . . .”143 Quoting Prometheus, it reiterated: 
“[S]imply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, 
namely a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle.”144 And the 
Court went even further: 
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while add-
ing the words ‘apply it’ ” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the 
use of an abstract idea “to a particular technological environment.” Stating an 
abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply com-
bines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recita-
tion of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement” an abstract idea 
“on a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion 
accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. 
Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is 
not generally the sort of “additional feature” that provides any “practical assur-
ance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the 
abstract idea itself.”145 
In short, the application of algorithms through the use of computer software 
generally constitutes unpatentable subject matter. The claimed invention must 
 
138  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014). 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 217 (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. at 72–73). 
141  See id. at 216 (“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as 
one of pre-emption.”); supra text accompanying note 81. 
142  Alice, 573 U.S. at 212, 218–19, 221. 
143  Id. at 222. 
144  Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 84 (2012)). 
145  Id. at 223–24 (alterations and citations omitted) (quoting Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 
U.S. at 72, 77, 84, and  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010)). 
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“do more than simply . . . implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic comput-
er.”146 
 These decisions shook the patent law community and the software indus-
try. They have made it tremendously more difficult for inventors, and in partic-
ular software developers, to obtain patents. Within two years, it was estimated 
that the PTO had rejected around 60,000 patent applications due to Alice, and 
prosecutors had abandoned about 8,400 applications.147 
The Court’s recent § 101 decisions have also made existing patents more 
vulnerable to invalidation, as decisions like Alice retroactively affect patents 
that have already issued.148 In fact, two years after the Court decided Alice, fed-
eral courts saw a 400% increase in the number of § 101 cases they decided, and 
about 70% of these cases resulted in patent invalidation.149 This has pushed 
software developers away from trying to protect their inventions through pa-
tents.150 
 Even beyond shrinking patentable subject matter, the Court has decided 
other patent cases resulting in making patent protection less desirable for soft-
ware developers. It has heightened the non-obviousness requirement by shifting 
 
146  Id. at 225. Since Alice was decided, lower courts have limited the case’s reach, finding 
something of a middle ground between Alice and its predecessors. See, e.g., Cardionet, LLC 
v. Infobionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
147  See Robert Sachs, Two Years After Alice: The Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” 
(Part 2), BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2016), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2016/06/two-years-after-
alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-part-2/#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/MRJ5-23Z8] 
(explaining published data shows that 36,000 applications had been rejected based on Alice 
and that 5,000 applications had been abandoned but that, because published applications or-
dinarily account for only 60% of applications, the numbers are likely much higher); see also 
ANDREW A. TOOLE & NICHOLAS A. PAIROLERO, ADJUSTING TO ALICE: USPTO PATENT 
EXAMINATION OUTCOMES AFTER ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 3 (2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/72SA-SBWL] (“For Alice-affected technologies, the chances of receiving a first 
office action rejection with a rejection for patent-ineligible subject matter increased by 31% 
in the 18 months following Alice.”). The PTO has worked to mitigate this “Alice Effect,” 
and, a year after issuing further guidance on subject matter eligibility in January of 2019, 
“the chances of receiving a first office action rejection for patent-ineligible subject matter 
[had decreased] by 25% for Alice-affected technologies.” See id. at 6. 
148  According to one author: “It is difficult to understate the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions involving [patentable subject matter under] Section 101. Thousands of patents like-
ly became invalid after these decisions, essentially rendering them worthless at best.” Hricik, 
supra note 36, at 470–71 (footnote omitted). 
149  See Robert Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” 
(Part 1), BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2016/06/two-years-after-
alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case/ [https://perma.cc/EM83-QNSH]. 
150  Measuring the extent of this Alice phenomenon is difficult because, in the midst of our 
“Fourth Industrial Revolution,” the software industry continues to boom, and an increasing 
number of software patents are being issued. Raymond Millien, Six Years After Alice: 61.8% 
of U.S. Patents Issued in 2019 Were ‘Software-Related’—Up 21.6% from 2018, 
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/17/six-years-alice-61-
8-u-s-patents-issued-2019-software-related-21-6-2018/id=118986/ [https://perma.cc/BCE9-T 
AVP]. 
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its analysis from a focus on piecing together prior art to one focused instead on 
common sense, market demand, or design trends.151 It has also bolstered the 
definiteness requirement.152 The Court has made it more difficult for patent 
holders to establish infringement by narrowing the doctrine of equivalents,153 
limiting the circumstances under which infringement can occur outside of U.S. 
borders,154 making it more difficult for a patent holder to establish liability for 
one who induced another party to infringe,155 and expanding the conditions un-
der which a patentee has “exhausted” his patent rights such that he cannot es-
tablish liability against the relevant user.156 The Court has also made patent de-
fense tougher by increasing the number of individuals and entities that can 
work to invalidate a patent,157 limiting venue shopping among patent holders,158 
making it easier for patent challengers to be awarded attorneys’ fees from the 
patentee’s purse,159 and making it more difficult for patentees to obtain injunc-
 
151  See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“When there is a design 
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, pre-
dictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options 
within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the prod-
uct not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”); see also Hricik, supra note 
36, at 471–72 (suggesting that this change deters inventors from seeking patent protection). 
152  See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“In place of 
the ‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its 
claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, 
fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the inven-
tion.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 472 (indicating that this change makes it more dif-
ficult to patent inventions). 
153  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 726–27, 741 
(2002) (“While estoppel does not effect a complete bar, the question remains whether peti-
tioner can demonstrate that the narrowing amendments did not surrender the particular 
equivalents at issue.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 473–75. 
154  See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017); Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 477–78. 
155  See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 917 (2014) (explain-
ing that “a defendant may [not] be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other 
statutory provision”); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) 
(“Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge 
that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 476. 
But see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (“The question 
the Court confronts today concerns whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is 
a defense to a claim of induced infringement. It is not.”). 
156  See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017); Quanta 
Comput. Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 
478–80. 
157  See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007); see also Hricik, su-
pra note 36, at 480–81. 
158  See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517, 1520–21 
(2017); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 481–82. 
159  See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56 
(2014); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 482–84 (explaining the significance of the Octane 
Fitness decision in dissuading parties from obtaining patents). 
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tive relief even after they have established infringement.160 Finally, the Court 
has made it easier to challenge patent validity by creating new, post-grant ad-
ministrative proceedings within the PTO.161 Such proceedings are significantly 
less expensive and generally more effective in invalidating a patent than chal-
lenging validity in the courts.162 
While the Court has been making patent protection more onerous for soft-
ware developers, Congress has been working to make trade secret protection 
somewhat easier. One historical disadvantage of trade secret law is that it was 
rooted in state law and thus varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.163 In 2016, 
though, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which for the first time 
created a federal private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.164 
The recent provision of federal protection makes trade secret protection more 
desirable. Further, the new federal law expanded trade secret protection beyond 
the limits that states were providing.165 This has made trade secret law an even 
more valuable source of information protection. 
 
160  See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also Hricik, supra 
note 36, at 485–86. 
161  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(amending various parts of Title 35); see also Hricik, supra note 36, at 489. 
162  See Hricik, supra note 36, at 489–90 (“Post-grant proceedings are substantially less ex-
pensive than defending a patent suit. In addition, three features common to each proceeding, 
separately and together, make it demonstrably more likely that patents can be successfully 
challenged under these new post-grant proceedings than is the case in litigation.” (footnote 
omitted)). When challenging patent validity in the district courts, a presumption of validity 
(clear and convincing evidence) applies, whereas a determination of invalidity in a post-
grant proceeding is based on just a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Additionally, 
claims are viewed more broadly in post-grant proceedings than in court, increasing the like-
lihood of an invalidity determination. See id. Finally, a court may stay a patentee’s infringe-
ment lawsuit if the defendant can convince the PTO that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
one of the patent claims is invalid. See id. 
163  See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016) (explaining that the differences between state 
laws can be significant, potentially affecting “which party has the burden of establishing that 
a trade secret is not readily ascertainable, whether the owner has any rights against a party 
that innocently acquires a trade secret, the scope of information protectable as trade secret, 
and what measures are necessary to satisfy the requirement that the owner employ ‘reasona-
ble measures’ to maintain secrecy of the information”); Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/pub 
lications/blt/2016/09/03_cohen/ [https://perma.cc/3PNV-39VZ] (“Before the enactment of 
the DTSA, . . . companies seeking redress for trade-secret misappropriation [often] had no 
choice but to sue in state court, where laws protecting against trade-secret misappropriation 
tend to differ from state to state both in the text of the laws themselves and in their applica-
tion.”). But see S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016) (explaining that the UTSA “has been 
adopted (in its entirety or with some modifications) in 47 States and the District of Colum-
bia” and noting that “the differences between State laws and the UTSA are generally rela-
tively minor”). 
164  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
165  Not only does the DTSA define “trade secret” more broadly than the UTSA, see Joseph 
D. Mornin, What You Need to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (2016) (“The DTSA definition of ‘trade secret’ is broader than the UTSA 
definition.”), but it also, for example, “allows ex parte seizures of misappropriated trade se-
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All of these changes in IP law have pushed software developers deeper into 
the world of trade secrets.166 If patents are more difficult to obtain and easier to 
invalidate, the trade-off of disclosing your inventions in exchange for a twenty-
year much-more-limited patent is less worthwhile. 
II.  PRIVATE ALGORITHMS, PUBLIC INTERESTS 
In the wake of these movements in IP law, trade secret law has emerged as 
a useful means of software protection. It is debatable whether the resulting 
broad secrecy surrounding valuable software could spur or quell competition 
within the industry and serve as a boon or bust to consumers. Within particular 
pockets of public law, though, this secrecy has created significant public policy, 
statutory, and even constitutional concerns. These serious issues arise from 
several potential shortcomings of algorithms that secrecy can mask. First is the 
problem of inaccuracy. This could result in travesties such as defendants being 
convicted and deprived of their liberty or lives based on erroneous machine 
outputs.167 Another potential problem of algorithms is bias. This could mean 
that an individual is deprived of fair treatment in housing, employment, or even 
services because of algorithmic injustice.168 A third concern is security. In the 
realm of voting, for example, secrecy masking the security or insecurity of 
electronic voting machines could result in undermining democracy.169 
Overall, the broad secrecy resulting in part from recent changes in IP law 
has created significant concerns. Secret algorithms used in areas that affect the 
public interest are particularly problematic. Issues are already arising in a 
whole host of contexts, including criminal justice, housing, and voting. 
A. Criminal Justice 
 Secret algorithms are starting to play a major role in the world of criminal 
justice. Police officers, judges, lawyers, and forensic scientists are making use 
of new science– and technology–based algorithms to measure blood-alcohol 
levels, match fingerprints, predict recidivism for bail and sentencing purposes, 
improve policing, and gather and act on other data.170 Some advantages of rely-
ing on algorithms in these contexts is that they offer the potential to provide 
greater fairness to defendants across cases and remove judicial and other con-
 
crets.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets Act, supra note 
163 (“One provision of the new DTSA that has generated much commentary in the run up to 
its enactment is the new civil seizure mechanism established by the statute.”). 
166  See 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 9, at § 9.02 (“Perhaps an example of unintended 
consequences, the [America Invents Act’s] prior user rights provision may, in some circum-
stances, militate in favor of keeping an invention as a trade secret rather than seeking patent 
protection.”). 
167  See infra Section II.A. 
168  See infra Section II.B. 
169  See infra Section II.C. 
170  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 277–78, 292–93. 
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scious and unconscious biases from criminal justice decisionmaking.171 They 
also may lend greater efficiency to the criminal justice system.172 
 Despite these advantages of the purported evidence-based approach that 
these algorithms offer, there are real questions about the accuracy of these algo-
rithms. For example, in a 2016 study of COMPAS—an algorithm-based pro-
gram used to predict recidivism for criminal justice decisionmaking—
ProPublica found the program to be only “somewhat more accurate than a coin 
flip.”173 And even more concerning than the accuracy of prediction programs 
like COMPAS are the questions about the accuracy of “conviction pro-
grams”174—programs that criminal justice actors use to actually determine the 
guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.175 Prosecutors regularly present evi-
dence in court based on the secret algorithms embedded in breathalyzers, auto-
mated fingerprint identification systems, and probabilistic genotyping sys-
tems.176 Judges ordinarily readily admit these computer outputs into evidence, 
and judges and jurors often eagerly convict defendants based on this evi-
dence.177 All of this could lead to a long term of imprisonment or even death for 
the defendant.178 Yet, the true accuracy of these tools often remains un-
known.179 When defendants have requested access to the underlying source 
codes and algorithms powering these programs and producing their outputs, 
judges have ordinarily denied their requests.180 Yet, on occasion, the public has 
gotten a glimpse into the potential inaccuracies propagated by these secret pro-
grams.181 For example, in one case out of New York, two rival probabilistic 
genotyping systems—TrueAllele and STRmix—were used to determine 
 
171  See id. at 281–87. 
172  See id. at 286. 
173  See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propu 
blica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/8G 
DM-X55C]. 
174  Ryan, supra note 12, at 270. 
175  See id. at 293 (explaining that “more is simply at stake when the question is one of inno-
cence rather than one of temporary pretrial confinement or punishment for those already de-
termined guilty”). 
176  See id. at 292–93. 
177  See id. 
178  See id. at 272 (“Yet even more is at stake—a defendant's liberty or even his life—where 
conviction programs are involved.”). 
179  See id. at 303 (“Although much is at stake where convictions are involved, and although 
prosecutors regularly present evidence produced by conviction programs as nearly indisput-
able, there are real questions about the accuracy of the outputs that these conviction pro-
grams produce and that prosecutors rely on so heavily today.”); cf. PASQUALE, supra note 31, 
at 14–15 (“Although internet giants say their algorithms are scientific and neutral tools, it is 
very difficult to verify those claims. And while they have become critical economic infra-
structure, trade secrecy law permits managers to hide their methodologies, and business 
practices, deflecting scrutiny.” (footnote omitted)). 
180  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 305–23. 
181  See id. at 310, 316. 
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whether the DNA found at a murder scene matched the defendant’s DNA.182 
The two programs produced contradictory results, indicating that one of them 
had to be incorrect.183 And errors are not limited to new technologies like prob-
abilistic genotyping systems. When experts examined breathalyzer source code 
that a judge (anomalously) ordered released in New Jersey, they discovered al-
gorithmic errors leading to erroneous blood-alcohol concentration outputs that 
had been regularly used in criminal cases.184 
 Beyond this striking inaccuracy concern, algorithm-based programs also 
raise questions of bias—that these algorithms unjustly discriminate against cer-
tain groups of people.185 For example, the ProPublica study noting the unrelia-
bility of COMPAS’s recidivism predictions also exposed some of the biases 
embedded in the algorithm’s outcomes.186 Specifically, ProPublica explained 
that the program “turned up significant racial disparities.”187 In predicting re-
cidivism, “[t]he formula was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants 
as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as 
white defendants. . . . White defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often 
than black defendants.”188 Even after accounting for criminal history, type of 
 
182  See Seth Augenstein, Subjective DNA Mixture Analysis, Used in Thousands of Cases, 
Blasted by WH Panel, FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016, 12:37 PM), https://forensicresources.o 
rg/articles/subjective-dna-mixture-analysis-used-in-thousands-of-cases-blasted-by-wh-panel/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4XB-72B9]. 
183  See id. 
184  See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 157 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that one “ex-
pert . . . identified a significant flaw in the [breathalyzer] program’s source code that, in lim-
ited circumstances, can lead to an inaccurate reported BAC test result” and that, although an 
opposing expert “disputed many of the conclusions proffered by defendants’ experts, . . . he 
acknowledged and explained the buffer overflow defect, admitting that he was responsible 
for the inclusion of this error in the code”); see also State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 
685 (Minn. 2009) (noting the appellant’s report, which “analyzed the New Jersey machine’s 
computer source code and uncovered a variety of defects that could impact the test result”). 
185  One of the draws of relying on algorithms is that they have a reputation of being more 
objective than humans, and in that sense they provide promise for shedding bias in important 
decisionmaking. See supra text accompanying note 171. But algorithms can also be biased. 
Sometimes the bias is baked in through biased computer programmers or bad data. See 
Rumman Chowdhury & Narendra Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Oct. 24, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/auditing-algorithms-for-bias [https://perma.cc/QDQ 
8-ESRV]. Rumman Chowdhury and Narendra Mulani have questioned: 
Can AI provide the veil of ignorance that would lead us to objective and ideal out-
comes? . . . The answer so far has been disappointing. However objective we may intend our 
technology to be, it is ultimately influenced by the people who build it and the data that feeds it. 
Technologists do not define the objective functions behind AI independent of social context. Da-
ta is not objective, is it [sic] reflective of pre-existing social and cultural biases. In practice, AI 
can be a method of perpetuating bias, leading to unintended negative consequences and inequi-
table outcomes. 
Id. Complementing this baked-in bias, sometimes algorithm results create a disparate impact 
on minorities simply because of the particular factors used to assess the issue in question. 
186  Angwin et al., supra note 173. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
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crime, race, and gender, ProPublica found that “[b]lack defendants were still 77 
percent more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future vio-
lent crime and 45 percent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime 
of any kind.”189 In other words, the algorithm was biased.190 
Another prediction algorithm used within the criminal justice system is 
PredPol—software developed for police departments that allows police officers 
to concentrate their limited resources in areas that are probabilistically most 
likely to see future crime.191 This software also comes with concerns about bi-
ases. Some commentators have characterized it as discriminatory in nature, be-
cause PredPol’s outputs generally direct law enforcement to police poor, mi-
nority neighborhoods more closely than other neighborhoods.192 
 Despite this evidence of inaccuracies and biases in both prediction and 
conviction programs, the true extent of these issues remains veiled by the se-
crecy enveloping these programs.193 Often the developers of these algorithms 
are private, for-profit entities, and they understandably want to maintain their 
monopoly over the programs to amass the greatest returns on their invest-
ments.194 As such, these developers claim trade secret protection over their pro-
grams, and judges have generally upheld these claims.195 Perhaps surprisingly, 
even the police officers, forensic scientists, and other experts who use and rely 
 
189  Id. 
190  The picture is actually more complicated, though. Northpointe, “the company that devel-
oped COMPAS,” and several criminologists disputed this conclusion. See Matthias 
Spielkamp, Inspecting Algorithms for Bias, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2017), https://www.te 
chnologyreview.com/2017/06/12/105804/inspecting-algorithms-for-bias/ [https://perma.cc/F 
A53-ZJPA]. And, in fact, whether the algorithm is fair depends upon how you measure fair-
ness. See id. Cathy O’Neil has asserted that, although “the COMPAS scoring system is well-
calibrated,” it was unfair. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 224 (2016). 
“[T]he percentage of high-risk scores among blacks and among whites matches the actual 
rate of recidivism among blacks and among whites[,]” but ProPublica “found there were 
twice as many false positives for blacks as for whites, and twice as many false negatives for 
whites as for blacks.” Id. 
191  See PREDPOL, https://www.predpol.com/ [https://perma.cc/9XZN-VM2A]; see also 
O’NEIL, supra note 190, at 85 (“Predictive programs like PredPol are all the rage in budget-
strapped police departments across the country.”). 
192  See Jack Smith, IV, Crime-Prediction Tool May Be Reinforcing Discriminatory Policing, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2016, 4:02 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/predictive-
policing-discriminatory-police-crime-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/94J7-8KXG]; see also Jamie 
Grierson, Predictive Policing Poses Discrimination Risk, Thinktank Warns, GUARDIAN (Sept. 
15, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/16/predictive-policing-
poses-discrimination-risk-thinktank-warns [https://perma.cc/3Q5G-CFA7] (“Predictive po-
licing—the use of machine-learning algorithms to fight crime—risks unfairly discriminating 
against protected characteristics including race, sexuality and age, a security thinktank has 
warned.”). 
193  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 304–05. 
194  See id. at 324 (“One of the reasons that these algorithms and source codes are kept secret 
is that outside companies have created them and rely on this secrecy to make profits; the al-
gorithms and source codes are proprietary in nature.”). 
195  See id. at 304–23. 
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on these programs are not privy to their algorithms.196 The government may 
have asked for validation information upon purchasing or licensing the pro-
grams, but there often has been no thorough, independent review of the instru-
ments producing outputs that could affect the fates of criminal defendants.197 
This is just astounding. 
 The secrecy surrounding these algorithms that affect the dispositions of 
criminal cases and criminal defendants’ futures goes beyond shocking and may 
even amount to constitutional violations.198 Under the Supreme Court’s revital-
ization of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington199 and its prog-
eny,200 denying criminal defendants access to evidence that the prosecution is 
relying on for convictions could constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.201 
Even if a forensic scientist conducts a probabilistic genotyping system test on a 
DNA sample and the defense has the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic 
scientist about the report, because the forensic scientist has little to no 
knowledge about how the probabilistic genotyping system functions, this cross-
examination may not be very useful to the defense.202 Instead, one could say 
that the Confrontation Clause requires that the defense has the opportunity to 
cross-examine the developer of the algorithm or have access to the algorithm 
itself.203 Intertwined with this Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause argu-
ment is the concern that allowing judges and juries to base convictions on the 
prosecution’s presentation of secret evidence amounts to a Due Process viola-
tion as well.204 Among many other things, the Due Process Clause requires that 
criminal defendants have a “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accu-
sations.”205 This right even includes providing defendants with the necessary 
 
196  See id. at 294, 297–98. 
197  See id. at 295 (“In reality, though, there may be insufficient research or validation studies 
propping up many of these programs or the algorithms and source codes on which they are 
built.”). 
198  See id. at 329–41. In addition to the Confrontation Clause and Due Process arguments I 
discuss here, convicting criminal defendants based on secret evidence also raises concerns 
about constitutional violations under the disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. See Ryan, supra note 12, at 339–40. 
199  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
200  See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 657–58 (2011) (requiring that the 
forensic examiner conducting forensic tests later presented in court must be the same indi-
vidual that the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine about the report); Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009) (determining that a forensic report is 
“testimonial” such that the Confrontation Clause requirements apply and thus requiring that 
the defendant have the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about the report). 
201  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 334–38 (“Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to infor-
mation that may be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a significant consti-
tutional concern under both the Due Process Clauses and the Confrontation Clause.”). 
202  See id. at 336–37. 
203  See id. 
204  See id. at 329–41. 
205  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 
547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
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financial resources to do so.206 Denying defendants access to the details of the 
evidence presented against them robs them of this fair opportunity.207 
 Overall, in the world of criminal justice, relying on algorithms to dole out 
more uniform justice certainly has its benefits—and its proponents—but it also 
creates some concerns that are tied to the lack of transparency involved in rely-
ing on these algorithms. When the price of relying on algorithms in this context 
is a potential violation of important constitutional rights, it raises the questions 
of whether we should really be using algorithms in this way and, if we do, 
whether we can make uses of them more transparent to avoid these constitu-
tional concerns. 
B.  Housing 
 There are also secret algorithms at play in the housing context that similar-
ly raise serious concerns—particularly with respect to bias. Algorithm-created 
bias is a phenomenon across fields, but algorithmic bias in the context of the 
basic human right to housing208 is especially troubling. 
Discrimination in housing has a long history in this country.209 Landlords 
historically turned away Blacks who sought to lease their properties, neighbor-
hood associations refused to let Blacks move into the area, banks refused to of-
fer mortgages to minorities, and the federal government refused to insure any 
 
teenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))). 
206  See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1985) (reiterating that “mere access to the 
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process” and 
explaining that “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indi-
gent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense”). 
207  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 335 (“Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to information 
that may be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a significant constitutional 
concern under both the Due Process Clauses and the Confrontation Clause.”). 
208  See Carlie Armstrong, Slow Progress: New Federal Rules Only Begin to Address Hous-
ing Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 9 MOD. AM., Summer 
2013, at 2, 3 (explaining that Congress has expanded the Fair Housing Act because of “a 
growing recognition of housing as a fundamental human right”); Miles Walser, Note, Putting 
the Brakes on Rent Increases: How the United States Could Implement German Anti-
Gentrification Laws Without Running Afoul of the Takings Clause, 36 WIS. INT’L L.J. 186, 
209–10 (2019) (“In the United States, the human right to housing is, thanks in part to hous-
ing rights activists, arguably a part of these baseline values, even if not yet formally recog-
nized.”). 
209  See Olga Khazan, Being Black in America Can Be Hazardous to Your Health, ATLANTIC 
(Jul./Aug. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-in-
america-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/ [https://perma.cc/TM64-EEB5]; see also 
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17–18, 20, 22, 27, 34, 36 (2017). 
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minorities who were successful in obtaining mortgages.210 In 1968, Congress 
passed the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in housing on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”211 Despite 
this action, discrimination in housing remains a persistent, pernicious problem. 
It may not be as widespread or obvious as it once was, but evidence suggests 
that individuals and corporations continue to discriminate against minorities—
whether intentionally or unintentionally—on a regular basis. 
Today, discrimination in housing is often masked by secret algorithms pro-
tected by company trade secrets. Still, some limited investigations have found 
evidence of such discrimination. For example, following an in-depth study of 
algorithmic discrimination,212 in March 2019, the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) filed suit against Facebook for allowing adver-
tisers to discriminate in their housing advertisements on the Facebook platform 
and also for Facebook’s own discrimination in using an algorithm that shows 
advertisements to only particular users based upon the users’ characteristics, 
including proxies for race.213 
 
210  See Khazan, supra note 209; see also, e.g., Jonathan Mahler & Steve Eder, ‘No Vacan-
cies’ for Blacks: How Donald Trump Got His Start, and Was First Accused of Bias, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/us/politics/donald-trump-housi 
ng-race.html [https://perma.cc/3GRJ-MQW6] (relating how Trump Management has a histo-
ry of discriminating against Blacks). 
211  42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1974). The categories of sex, disability, and familial status were added 
in later amendments to the Act. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619; Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-383, 88 Stat. 633. 
212  See Julia Angwin et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by 
Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-
advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/K3WQ-33F8]; 
Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-
advertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/8J43-B4CK]; see also Ariana Tobin, 
HUD Sues Facebook Over Housing Discrimination and Says the Company’s Algorithms 
Have Made the Problem Worse, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://www.propub 
lica.org/article/hud-sues-facebook-housing-discrimination-advertising-algorithms [https://per 
ma.cc/U5M6-WYNJ] (“ProPublica first reported in 2016 that Facebook allowed housing 
advertisers to exclude users by race. Then in 2017, ProPublica found that—despite Face-
book’s promised changes—the company was still letting advertisers exclude users by race, 
gender, ethnicity, family status, ability and other characteristics.”). 
213  See Charge of Discrimination at 4–6, Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Facebook, Inc., 
(Mar. 28, 2019) (FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documen 
ts/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/H25U-99LA]; Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, 
HUD Is Reviewing Twitter’s and Google’s Ad Practices as Part of Housing Discrimination 
Probe, WASH. POST, (Mar. 28, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2 
019/03/28/hud-charges-facebook-with-housing-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/9Q5D-Z3W 
X]. Shortly before HUD filed the complaint, Facebook was working with HUD to reform its 
practices. Tobin, supra note 212. But HUD filed this complaint even “after Facebook an-
nounced sweeping changes to its advertising portal, preventing landlords, employers and 
lenders from discriminating in housing, employment or credit ads.” Id. A Facebook spokes-
man “said a breakdown occurred when the government asked for total and unfettered access 
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With respect to allowing the advertisers, themselves, to discriminate on the 
Facebook platform, HUD alleged the following: 
Respondent [Facebook] has provided a toggle button that enables advertisers to 
exclude men or women from seeing an ad, a search-box to exclude people who 
do not speak a specific language from seeing an ad, and a map tool to exclude 
people who live in a specified area from seeing an ad by drawing a red line 
around that area. Respondent also provides drop-down menus and search boxes 
to exclude or include (i.e., limit the audience of an ad exclusively to) people who 
share specified attributes. Respondent has offered advertisers hundreds of thou-
sands of attributes from which to choose, for example to exclude “women in the 
workforce,” “moms of grade school kids,” “foreigners,” “Puerto Rico Islanders,” 
or people interested in “parenting,” “accessibility,” “service animal,” “Hijab 
Fashion,” or “Hispanic Culture.” Respondent also has offered advertisers the 
ability to limit the audience of an ad by selecting to include only those classified 
as, for example, “Christian” or “Childfree.”214 
Beyond that, Facebook also allows advertisers to select “Custom Audiences” 
and “Lookalike Audiences,” which empowers the advertiser to target a specific 
list of users to view the advertisement, choose the viewers based on users’ in-
teractions with the advertisers’ other content, or select viewers based on the 
characteristics they share with the advertisers’ existing customers.215 
Even aside from discrimination resulting from advertisers’ selections of 
audiences, HUD alleged that Facebook’s proprietary algorithm, itself, discrimi-
nated in violation of the Fair Housing Act.216 According to HUD: 
During . . . the ad delivery phase, Respondent selects from among the users eli-
gible to see an ad which users will actually see it. Respondent bases this decision 
in large part on the inferences and predictions it draws about each user’s likeli-
hood to respond to an ad based on the data it has about that user, the data it has 
about other users whom it considers to resemble that user, and the data it has 
about “friends” and other associates of that user. To decide which users will see 
an ad, Respondent considers sex and close proxies for the other protected clas-
ses. Such proxies can include which pages a user visits, which apps a user has, 
 
to the company’s user base, a request the social media giant denied because it would have set 
a dangerous precedent.” Jan & Dwoskin, supra. The Washington Post Editorial Board has 
cautioned that we ought to be wary of the motives behind the lawsuit. See Ed. Bd., Discrimi-
nation on Facebook Is a Real Problem. But Carson’s Motives Warrant Skepticism, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 31, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/discrimination-
on-facebook-is-a-real-problem-but-carsons-motives-warrant-skepticism/2019/03/31/0c28fd6 
e-524f-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html [https://perma.cc/6CSM-3SUE] (“[S]ome skep-
ticism is warranted.”). It notes that, “as a matter of policy, the housing department under this 
administration has seemed more interested in dismantling housing protections than ensuring 
they are respected” and suggests that Secretary Carson’s actions likely stem from the general 
sentiment by Republicans and the White House that tech companies are biased against right-
wing politicians and ideas. Id. The Board suggests that this could be just one more attack on 
tech companies, and that a crack-down on discrimination in housing “may be happening for 
the wrong reason.” Id. 
214  Charge of Discrimination, supra note 213, at para. 14. 
215  See id. at para. 15–16. 
216  See id. at para. 17. 
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where a user goes during the day, and the purchases a user makes on and offline. 
Respondent alone, not the advertiser, determines which users will constitute the 
“actual audience” for each ad.217 
HUD Secretary Ben Carson explained that “[u]sing a computer to limit a per-
son’s housing choices can be just as discriminatory as slamming a door in 
someone’s face.”218 Commentators have characterized Facebook’s practices as 
“massively illegal [and] . . . as blatant a violation of the federal Fair Housing 
Act as one can find.”219 They have also characterized these practices as a bla-
tant violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.220 
 Facebook’s tactics are not unique. Twitter and Google, for example, use 
similar algorithms to target advertisements, and their conduct has also been un-
der review by HUD.221 As one reporter noted, “[t]he [Facebook] case is likely 
to have ripple effects throughout the tech industry, which considers targeting 
advertising to be standard practice and has historically enjoyed immunity from 
prosecution when third parties commit abuses on their platforms.”222 
Targeted advertising is not the only area in which reliance on algorithms 
has contributed to the already existing problem of discrimination in housing. 
For example, a 2019 study uncovered biases against minorities in the algo-
rithms mortgage companies rely on in determining how much interest to charge 
mortgagees.223 According to the study, mortgage companies relying on algo-
rithms regularly set mortgage purchase prices higher for African American and 
Latinx mortgagees than Caucasian mortgagees to the tune of more than five ad-
ditional basis points.224 This costs these minority groups about an extra $250–
$500 million each year.225 This sort of discrimination related to housing could 
 
217  Id. at para. 17. 
218  Tobin, supra note 212. 
219  Angwin & Parris, supra note 212 (quoting “prominent civil rights lawyer John Relman”). 
220  See id. 
221  See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 213. 
222  Id. 
223  See Robert P. Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. w25943, 2019), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu 
/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAC4-WLBR]; see also Pub. Affs., 
Mortgage Algorithms Perpetuate Racial Bias in Lending, Study Finds, BERKELEY NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://news.berkeley.edu/story_jump/mortgage-algorithms-perpetuate-raci 
al-bias-in-lending-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/X2RM-R64A] (“While lending discrimina-
tion has historically been caused by human prejudice, pricing disparities are increasingly the 
result of formulas that use machine learning to target applicants who might shop around less 
for higher-priced loans.”). 
224  See Bartlett et al., supra note 223 at 6 (“Latinx and African-American pay 5.3 basis 
points more in interest for purchase mortgages and 2.0 basis points for refinance mortgages 
originated on FinTech platforms.”). Despite this discrimination, the algorithms do seem to 
cause significantly less discrimination than face-to-face encounters. See id. (“FinTech algo-
rithms discriminate 40% less than face-to-face lenders . . . .”). 
225  See id. at 5 (“Averaging across the distribution of these products in the U.S., lending dis-
crimination currently costs African-Americans and Latinx borrowers $765 million in extra 
interest per year.”). 
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very well also be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, as it shows a disparate 
impact on minorities for a reason unrelated to a legitimate business necessity.226 
 Despite this evidence of pernicious biases within the housing context and 
across public-interest sectors, the full extent of such biases resulting from reli-
ance on algorithms is uncertain. Again, algorithm developers usually refuse to 
reveal their algorithms and instead operate under the protection of trade secret 
law. Thus, while biases can sometimes be detected through obvious disparate 
impacts, researchers generally engage in these analyses in only a relatively 
small number of instances. Moreover, algorithm secrecy makes it exceedingly 
difficult to assess biases baked into the algorithms themselves. 
C. Voting 
 The increasing secrecy surrounding software has created somewhat differ-
ent concerns in the world of election law. Voting in elections has long raised a 
number of difficulties. Two particular concerns that stand out are the fears of 
inaccurate and fraudulent results.227 How can we trust election officials to accu-
rately count millions of votes and, further, what prevents these election offi-
cials—and others—from surreptitiously flipping or discarding votes to change 
election outcomes? During the infamous 2000 U.S. presidential election, Flori-
da was mired in confusion about how punch ballots—with “hanging chads”—
should be counted.228 Following federal legislation, as well as some litigation, 
many jurisdictions shifted toward electronic voting.229 Indeed, most states today 
conduct at least some of their voting by electronic voting machine.230 Casting 
 
226  See 42 U.S.C. § 3605; Bartlett et al., supra note 223, at 25 n.20 (noting “that a lender that 
intentionally treated applicants differently based on a protected characteristic would be liable 
under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, for which there is no legitimate-
business-necessity defense”). 
227  See Jarrett Blanc, Electronic Voting, in CHALLENGING THE NORMS AND STANDARDS OF 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 12–13 (2007), https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_challe 
nging_election_norms_and_standards_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8W7-B97F]. 
228  See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Giving Up on Cybersecurity, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
320, 328 (2016) (“In the wake of the controversy about ‘hanging chads’ in the 2000 presi-
dential election, jurisdictions across the United States moved to modernize their voting 
equipment, including by adopting electronic voting machines or direct record electronic ma-
chines.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1713 (2005) (“Spurred by both legislation and litigation, states 
from Florida to California have taken steps to replace the infamous ‘hanging chad’ punch 
card with more modern—and supposedly more reliable—voting technology.”). 
229  See Tokaji, supra note 228, at 1713; see also Daniel Castro, Stop the Presses: How Pa-
per Trails Fail to Secure e-Voting, INFO. & TECH. INNOVATION FOUND., Sept. 2007, at 4–5, 
https://www.itif.org/files/evoting.pdf?_ga=2.22630258.878851144.1582752898-
1943129873.1582752898 [https://perma.cc/3SU7-AQL3] (suggesting that “the controversial 
2000 U.S. presidential election” led to a demand for change and a movement toward using 
electronic voting machines in the United States). 
230  See Voting Methods and Equipment by State, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Votin 
g_methods_and_equipment_by_state [https://perma.cc/2K3T-J63Z] (providing information 
on voting equipment in use in each state as of November 2018). These machines are also 
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votes electronically offers the potential to quickly and accurately count votes 
and present electoral outcomes, and electronic voting machines are also meant 
to make voting easier and reduce the state costs of voting.231 But along with 
these benefits, automation brings new risks.232 Although electronic voting ma-
chines mitigate the concern that officials counting individual votes might mis-
count or that they could intentionally change election outcomes, electronic vot-
ing machines create new risks of inaccuracy and fraud. There is the possibility 
that the algorithms and source codes on which the machines rely could contain 
errors. And there is the possibility that someone could hack the system to flip, 
discard, or manufacture votes, changing electoral outcomes. Unfortunately, 
these are not just hypothetical situations. They have already occurred to a sur-
prising extent. 
 There are several stories where the inaccuracies of electronic voting ma-
chines are apparent: 
In Fairfax County, VA, in 2003, a programming error in the electronic voting 
machines caused them to mysteriously subtract 100 votes from one particular 
candidates’ totals. 
 
In San Bernardino County, CA in 2001, a programming error caused the com-
puter to look for votes in the wrong portion of the ballot in 33 local elections, 
which meant that no votes registered on those ballots for that election. A recount 
was done by hand. 
 
In Volusia County, FL in 2000, an electronic voting machine gave Al Gore a fi-
nal vote count of negative 16,022 votes. 
 
The 2003 election in Boone County, IA, had the electronic vote-counting 
equipment showing that more than 140,000 votes had been cast in the Nov. 4 
municipal elections. The county has only 50,000 residents and less than half of 
them were eligible to vote in this election. 
 
There are literally hundreds of similar stories.233 
 
 Other inaccuracies may be more subtle. In recent years, there have been re-
ports of vote-flipping in Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, and Texas.234 Vote flipping can result from calibration or degradation of 
 
known as “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Systems.” Id. Although most states use these 
machines, eighteen states still rely exclusively on paper ballots, and three states conduct vot-
ing through mail. See id. 
231  See Blanc, supra note 227, at 12–14. 
232  See id. 
233  Bruce Schneier, The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Nov. 
10, 2004, 9:15 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html 
[https://perma.cc/575C-H6EE]. 
234  See Sue Halpern, How Voting-Machine Errors Reflect a Wider Crisis for American De-
mocracy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-
voting-machine-errors-reflect-a-wider-crisis-for-american-democracy [https://perma.cc/HX8 
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the touch screen components that voters use to record their votes.235 This is a 
growing problem as states’ electronic voting machines are being used past their 
expiration dates.236 In 2018, the Brennan Center reported that forty-one states 
used electronic voting machines that were at least ten years old—“dangerously 
close to or past the end of the expected lifespan for the core components of [the 
machines].”237 Further, many of the electronic voting machines currently in use 
are no longer manufactured, which has left election officials combing through 
Craigslist or eBay for spare parts.238 In addition to age and maintenance con-
cerns, there is little verification that the machines properly record votes in ordi-
nary course. Although some voting machines provide paper receipts to voters 
who then can ensure that their votes were correctly recorded, several states’ 
machines do not provide this information, and, in some states, only a fraction of 
the machines in service provide these receipts.239 Further, even when machines 
 
S-85TB] (explaining “how susceptible touch-screen voting machines are to error, especially 
because they often rely on outdated and unsupported software”); Tim Lau, Vote Flipping 
Claims Underline Urgent Need to Fix Voting Machines, BRENNAN CTR. (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/votes-were-registered-incorrectly-georgia-governors-rac 
e [https://perma.cc/3PMT-Z9Q9] (“Old touchscreen voting machines are especially vulnera-
ble to vote flipping. Many of these machines rely on outdated technology and can cause 
problems such as calibration errors.”). 
235  See Halpern, supra note 234 (“[T]ypically machines flip votes because they aren’t 
properly calibrated. This can happen, and does happen, to candidates from any party.”); Lau, 
supra note 234. 
236  See Halpern, supra note 234 (“The voting machines purchased back in the early two-
thousands were never meant to last this long. They have a shelf life of ten, maybe fifteen 
years. Many are no longer made, or the companies that manufactured them have gone out of 
business, or both.”); Lau, supra note 234; see also Jonathan Lai, N.J. Was Going to Have 
Paper-Based Voting Machines More than a Decade Ago. Will It Happen by 2020?, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/new-jersey/nj-voting-machines 
-paper-trail-20190310.html [https://perma.cc/Y22H-WEYV] (stating that New Jersey’s “cur-
rent machines are nearing death”). 
237  Lau, supra note 234. 
238  See Halpern, supra note 234 (“To get spare parts, election officials have had to scour 
eBay and Craigslist, looking for old machines that other municipalities have discarded.”); 
see also Lau, supra note 234 (“[A]s of 2018, 43 states and the District of Columbia use poll-
ing machine models that are no longer manufactured. The use of these machines is troubling 
because in the event of a technical malfunction, it can be difficult to find replacement parts 
and technicians with the ability to repair them.”). 
239  See Voting Methods and Equipment by State, supra note 230; see also Voting System Pa-
per Trail Requirements, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS (June 27, 2019), http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting-system-paper-trail-requirements.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/Q4A2-PYQ6]; see also Castro, supra note 229, at 7 (suggesting “voter-verified 
paper audit trails” would allow the voter to verify that her vote was correctly recorded but 
explaining “[r]equiring that voter-verified paper audit trails be generated by DRE voting ma-
chines would increase the cost and complexity of elections”). Importantly, many states simp-
ly do not have the funds to upgrade their electronic voting machines to ones that provide pa-
per trails. See Voting System Paper Trail Requirements, supra (explaining “that some 
states . . . may have [a statutory] requirement for a voter-verifiable paper record but have not 
had the funding to replace voting equipment in recent years, so in practice may have ma-
chines without a paper trail”). 
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produce these paper records for voters, there seems to be no data about how 
many voters review their receipts, verify the accuracy of the recorded votes, 
and lodge a complaint if the machine erroneously recorded the votes.240 
Beyond the accuracy concern is the alarming question of whether hackers 
can physically or virtually break into these machines to alter individual votes 
and election outcomes. Although recent evidence that the Russians have been 
meddling in U.S. elections has heightened security concerns,241 the security of 
electronic voting machines has long been in question. For decades, computer 
scientists have been sounding the alarm about the vulnerabilities of these ma-
chines.242 Ever since states adopted electronic voting machines, computer sci-
entists have repeatedly demonstrated that almost every type of machine is vul-
nerable to hacking.243 “The systems were not initially designed with robust 
security in mind, and even where security features were included, experts have 
found them to be poorly implemented with glaring holes.”244 
There is an overwhelming number of examples of successful attempts to 
hack electronic voting machines. In 2005, an election official in Florida’s Leon 
County hired experts to test the security of the county’s voting machines.245 In 
 
240  Provided that a voter reviews her vote to determine that it was correctly recorded, the 
paper trail would allow for a back-up manual counting mechanism. 
241  See Clare Malone, Russians Are Targeting Private Election Companies, Too—And States 
Aren’t Doing Much About It, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, (July 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirty 
eight.com/features/russians-are-targeting-private-election-companies-too-and-states-arent-d 
oing-much-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/23GN-5EJA]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot 
to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-
trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/2FHA-BMGQ]; Kim Zetter, The Crisis of Election Se-
curity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/electio 
n-security-crisis-midterms.html [https://perma.cc/5WN7-MCXD]. 
242  See Halpern, supra note 234 (stating that electronic voting machines’ “vulnerabilities 
have been known for nearly two decades”); Bruce Schneier, By November, Russian Hackers 
Could Target Voting Machines, WASH. POST (July 27, 2016, 12:10 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-november-russian-
hackers-could-target-voting-machines/ [https://perma.cc/G87R-HCEQ] (“[W]hile computer 
security experts like me have sounded the alarm for many years, states have largely ignored 
the threat, and the machine manufacturers have thrown up enough obfuscating babble that 
election officials are largely mollified.”); Zetter, supra note 241 (explaining that a computer 
scientist rang the alarm before the Help America Vote Act was passed). 
243  Kim Zetter, The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-
machine.html [https://perma.cc/G64T-8J47] (“In the [approximately]15 years since electron-
ic voting machines were first adopted by many states, numerous reports by computer scien-
tists have shown nearly every make and model to be vulnerable to hacking.”). 
244  Id. 
245  See Zachary Goldfarb, As Elections Near, Officials Challenge Balloting Security in Con-
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each of the four tests, experts were able to break into the machines and alter the 
(fictitious) election outcomes by manipulating the machines’ memory cards.246 
In 2016, one individual—luckily a security researcher—purchased old voting 
machines on eBay with the purpose of examining the machines to observe their 
vulnerabilities.247 Not only did he discover that “the tamper-proof screws didn’t 
work, . . . the hard drives had not been wiped . . . . [and] [t]he information [he] 
found on the drives, including candidates, precincts, and the number of votes 
cast on the machine, were not encrypted,” but he was easily able to reverse-
engineer the machines to manipulate them.248 Further, the researcher bought 
additional “next generation” machines two years later and found them even 
easier to hack.249 
In 2018, at DEF CON 26, an annual conference that brings together some 
of the best hackers in the country, hackers explored some of the vulnerabilities 
of U.S. electronic voting equipment.250 In a stunning report, California’s Secre-
tary of State, Alex Padilla, chronicled some of the findings from the confer-
ence’s “Voting Village”: 
•  A voting tabulator that is currently used in 23 states is vulnerable to be 
remotely hacked via a network attack. Because the device in question 
is a high-speed unit designed to process a high volume of ballots for an 
entire county, hacking just one of these machines could enable an at-
tacker to flip the Electoral College and determine the outcome of a 
presidential election. 
•  A second critical vulnerability in the same machine was disclosed to 
the vendor a decade ago, yet that machine, which was used into 2016, 
still contains the flaw. 
•  Another machine used in 18 states was able to be hacked in only two 
minutes, while it takes the average voter six minutes to vote. This indi-
cates one could realistically hack a voting machine in the polling place 
on Election Day within the time it takes to vote. 
•  Hackers had the ability to wirelessly reprogram, via mobile phone, a 
type of electronic card used by millions of Americans to activate the 
 
246  See id. 
247  See Brian Varner, I Bought Used Voting Machines on eBay for $100 Apiece. What I 
Found Was Alarming, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/i-
bought-used-voting-machines-on-ebay/ [https://perma.cc/NA7S-ABBR]. 
248  Id. 
249  See id. (“To my dismay, I discovered that the newer model machines—those that were 
used in the 2016 election—are running Windows CE and have USB ports, along with other 
components, that make them even easier to exploit than the older ones.”). 
250  See MATT BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 26 VOTING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2018), 
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20village%20 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WJ-CD66]; see also Sue Halpern, Election-Hacking Lessons 
from the 2018 Def Con Hackers Conference, NEW YORKER (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/election-hacking-lessons-from-the-2018-def-con 
-hackers-conference [https://perma.cc/JN35-WPUT] (“Def Con would bring more than 
twenty-five-thousand of the most avid hackers in the world together . . . .”). 
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voting terminal to cast their ballots. This vulnerability could be ex-
ploited to take over the voting machine on which they vote and cast as 
many votes as the voter wanted.251 
The full report, which contains expositions by various experts, sets forth an 
astounding number of vulnerabilities embedded in our electronic voting ma-
chines.252 This devastating report and the smattering of anecdotes above are just 
a small window into the immense tangle of electronic voting machine vulnera-
bility issues that plague our voting systems across the country. 
Manufacturers of the electronic voting machines emphatically deny that 
security risks exist and that their machines are susceptible to hacking. Many of 
the hacking successes, they explain, required direct access to the machine, 
which they suggest is not a realistic scenario.253 Instead, the machines are air-
gapped—they are not connected to the internet.254 Jeanette Manfra, the now 
former Assistant Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
Cybersecurity and Communications, has recently said that “voting machines 
are physically secure, we’ve got thousands of jurisdictions across the country 
that all use different things. And so while you may be able to get into a few vot-
ing machines, you can’t really affect that at scale without detection, and it 
would be really hard.”255 Accordingly, Manfra concluded that “it’s actually re-
ally, really difficult to manipulate the actual vote count itself.”256 
The overwhelming number of examples of successful voting machine 
hacking exploits makes these denials dubious. One information technology ex-
pert who is also a former White House liaison on cybersecurity literally said 
 
251  BLAZE ET AL., supra note 250, at 5 (emphasis omitted). The full report by Matt Blaze et 
al. goes into significant detail about numerus vulnerabilities of various electronic voting ma-
chines. See generally id. (detailing machine vulnerabilities and laying out some steps that 
states may take in improving the security of their elections). 
252  See generally id. (detailing machine vulnerabilities and laying out some steps that states 
may take in improving the security of their elections). 
253  See Goldfarb, supra note 245 (explaining that Diebold said the hacking experiment in 
question was “ ‘analogous to if I gave you the keys to my house and told you when I was 
gone,’ . . . giving hackers ‘complete unfettered access’ to the equipment, something a re-
sponsible elections administrator would never allow”). 
254  See Zetter, supra note 243. 
255  Alex Hern, Kids at Hacking Conference Show How Easily US Elections Could Be Sabo-
taged, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018 
/aug/22/us-elections-hacking-voting-machines-def-con [https://perma.cc/M54R-N9AB]. Pro-
fessor Alex Halderman explained that this “diversity” argument does not eliminate the secu-
rity threat. See id. In fact, although: 
the diversity of US election technology poses a challenge for an attacker, . . . “that helps in some 
ways and hurts in some ways.” A real threat, he points out, doesn’t need to steal every vote in 
every county in every state in the country. The bad actor just needs to steal enough votes in a 
few counties in America’s battleground states – just enough to swing a close election. “So rather 
than diversity protecting us, we have a diversity of strength and weakness, and that’s a weakness 
for everybody.” 
Id. 
256  Id. 
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Manfra’s conclusion is “bullshit.”257 He explained that the greatest risk to the 
security of voting machines is that the machines’ components are manufactured 
outside of the United States, primarily in China.258 “[O]nce you’re in the 
chips,” he said, “you can hack whole classes of machines, nationwide, from the 
fucking Kremlin.”259 Further, the coding on these machines is quite central-
ized—“[o]ne large vendor codes the system for 2,000 jurisdictions across 31 
states”—and if a hacker targets the coders, this could affect the functioning of 
the electronic voting machines, making sabotage a real possibility.260 In addi-
tion to these concerns, even air-gapped machines that do not originally have 
compromised chips or coding remain exposed. It was recently discovered that 
an unknown number of machines across the country have remote-access soft-
ware installed on them—probably for easy remote maintenance of the machines 
by the manufacturer—meaning that they could be remotely hacked.261 Further, 
election officials connect the machines to the internet to electronically transfer 
vote counts on election night, making them vulnerable to hacking when they 
transmit data to a central counting server.262 
It is difficult to know the true extent of the accuracy and security issues 
that electronic voting machines raise because, as with the criminal justice and 
housing algorithms, their underlying algorithms are closely held trade secrets. 
Some states have sought to examine these questionable algorithms by requiring 
electronic voting machine manufacturers to disclose their algorithms to the 
 
257  Id. 
258  See id. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. Other states use local small businesses. As Halderman explained, if a hacker were to 
target those small businesses, he could potentially “reprogram thousands of election ma-
chines at once.” Id. 
261  See Zetter, supra note 243. In July 2018, Diebold admitted to installing remote-access 
software on its voting machines, creating an even greater threat to the security of American 
voting. See Kim Zetter, Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access 
Software on Systems Sold to States, MOTHERBOARD (July 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mb4ezy/top-voting-machine-vendor-admits-it-
installed-remote-access-software-on-systems-sold-to-states [https://perma.cc/RKZ4-7LU6]. 
The company revealed this after previously denying it in a New York Times interview. See 
id.; Zetter, supra note 243. 
262  See Dan Patterson, Why Voting Machines in the U.S. Are Easy Targets for Hackers, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-voting-machines-
in-the-u-s-are-easy-targets-for-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/27GM-89LB] (“The other primary 
vulnerability is data transmission. In 2016 Symantec Security Response director Kevin Ha-
ley told CBS News, ‘The results go from [the voting machine] into a piece of electronics that 
takes it to the central counting place. That data is not encrypted and that’s vulnerable for 
manipulation.’ ”); Zetter, supra note 241 (“[M]any voting machines that elections officials 
insist are disconnected from the internet—and therefore beyond the reach of hackers—are in 
fact accessible by way of the modems they use to transmit vote totals on election night.”). 
Moreover, military personnel and citizens overseas often vote via the internet. See id. (“Alt-
hough most American voters cast ballots in person or by mail, 31 states and the District of 
Columbia offer some form of internet voting to military personnel and citizens living over-
seas.”). 
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state before the state would do business with them. For example, North Caroli-
na has a statute requiring manufacturers to turn over their algorithms and 
source codes so that state officials can review them and verify their accuracy 
and security, thereby “restor[ing] public confidence in the election process.”263 
Efforts like North Carolina’s have mostly been ineffective, though. In 2005, 
North Carolina’s supplier of electronic voting machines—Diebold Election 
Systems, Inc.—refused to turn over its software and code, claiming that they 
were secrets subject to confidentiality agreements with third parties.264 Despite 
a state court in effect concluding that Diebold must comply with the state legal 
requirements if it desired to sell its machines to North Carolina, the State Board 
of Elections ignored this directive and authorized Diebold as an electronic vot-
ing machine vendor anyway (although Diebold ultimately withdrew as a possi-
ble vendor).265 Accordingly, the true accuracy and security of North Carolina’s 
electronic voting machines remain unknown—just like the accuracy and securi-
ty of machines across the country. 
* * * * * 
 These serious questions of accuracy, bias, and security are pervasive. For 
example, an error in an algorithm powering autonomous vehicles could cause 
deadly crashes. An algorithm determining the extent of someone’s healthcare 
coverage could be based on biased inputs. Russia could hack U.S. drones, caus-
ing them to attack China and starting a war. Each of these eventualities could 
result from simple inaccuracies, expert hacks, or perhaps even biases. Our 
wired world presents all of these risks, but the full extent of them remains un-
known because developers’ trade secret claims largely cloak these dangers in 
secrecy. 
III. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 
 All of the secret algorithms underlying criminal justice prediction and con-
viction programs, Facebook’s targeted housing advertisements, and the elec-
tronic voting machines used throughout the United States make it difficult to 
understand the full extent of the inaccuracies, biases, and security risks embed-
ded in these algorithms. And the questions and associated problems of secret 
algorithms go beyond these three areas of criminal justice, housing, and voting. 
 
263  2005 N.C. SESS. LAW 323, https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF 
/2005-2006/SL2005-323.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S7P-2NAS]. 
264  See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction at 6, Diebold Election Sys., Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. Elections, No. 
05-CVS-15474 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2005); David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy 
on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 406, 419–21 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg 
eds., 2011). 
265  See Levine, supra note 264, at 420–21; Letter from Charles R. Owen, Div. Couns., 
Diebold Election Sys., Inc., to Gary Bartlett, Exec. Dir., North Carolina State Bd. Of Elec-
tions (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Diebold%20Folder/Barrett%20Lette 
r%2012-21-05-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECS5-KJMP]. 
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For example, in the world of healthcare, experts have found that some mobile 
medical apps produce erroneous results related to insulin dosage calculations or 
fetal heart monitoring.266 With respect to education services, research shows 
that Princeton Review uses discriminatory pricing, charging parents in Asian-
dominated neighborhoods more for their services—perhaps because Asian 
“Tiger Moms” may be willing to pay more for their children’s standardized test 
preparations.267 And Internet-of-Things devices can probably be hacked quite 
easily in a number of circumstances. In fact, there are reports of wireless baby 
monitors being hacked for the purpose of harassing parents, threatening child 
abductions, and carrying out financial thefts.268 The potentially devastating ef-
fects of algorithm shortcomings call for greater transparency. 
 In April of 2019, Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY-9) introduced a bill 
in the U.S. House of Representatives to try to address some of these con-
cerns.269 This Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 would require companies 
such as Facebook270 to conduct “automated decision system impact assess-
ments” to examine the risks these secret algorithms pose in “contribut[ing] to 
inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting consumers.”271 
The bill lacks much specificity, leaving significant discretion to the Federal 
Trade Commission to regulate in this area, therefore it is unclear how rigorous 
 
266  See Saba Akbar et al., Safety Concerns with Consumer-Facing Mobile Health Applica-
tions and Their Consequences: A Scoping Review, 27 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 330, 
331, 333–35 (2019). 
267  See Julia Angwin et al., The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as Likely to Get a 
Higher Price from Princeton Review, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-price-from-princeton-revi 
ew [https://perma.cc/N2V9-P3AA] (“One unexpected effect of the company’s geographic 
approach to pricing is that Asians are almost twice as likely to be offered a higher price than 
non-Asians . . . .”). 
268  See Camila Domonoske, S.C. Mom Says Baby Monitor Was Hacked; Experts Say Many 
Devices Are Vulnerable, NPR (June 5, 2018, 7:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/I-
way/2018/06/05/617196788/s-c-mom-says-baby-monitor-was-hacked-experts-say-many-dev 
ices-are-vulnerable [https://perma.cc/AX2G-M9KU]; Amy B. Wang, ‘I’m in Your Baby’s 
Room’: A Hacker Took over a Baby Monitor and Broadcast Threats, Parents Say, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/20/ 
nest-cam-baby-monitor-hacked-kidnap-threat-came-device-parents-say/?utm_term=.33ff265 
1306d [https://perma.cc/8UUU-BLXB]. 
269  See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. [hereinafter Algo-
rithmic Accountability Act (House)]. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced an identical 
bill in the Senate on the same day. See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 
116th Cong. 
270  The Act covers entities that “ha[ve] greater than [fifty million dollars] in average annual 
gross receipts for the 3-taxable-year period preceding the most recent fiscal year” and that 
“possess[] or control[] personal information on more than . . . [one million] consum-
ers . . . or . . . [one million] consumer devices.” See Algorithmic Accountability Act (House), 
supra note 269, at § 2(2)(5). 
271  Id. § 2(2)(C). It would also require such companies to “assess[] . . . the risks posed by the 
automated decision system to the privacy or security of personal information of consumers.” 
Id. 
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the regulatory strictures would be if the bill were passed. But the bill has stalled 
in Congress anyway,272 and it seems unlikely that it will result in any useful 
legislation.273 
 The inaccuracy, bias, and security risks that secret algorithms pose cry out 
for intervention, but each different scenario has varying nuances that must be 
taken into account. For example, where criminal justice algorithms are con-
cerned, the problem of secrecy pits the profit motives of algorithm developers 
against the justice concerns associated with incorrect and discriminatory recidi-
vism predictions and wrongful convictions. An unfair criminal justice algo-
rithm also negatively impacts the public because it may invalidate the bases for 
justified punishment, let the guilty go free, and erode the public’s confidence in 
the criminal justice system.274 Similarly, where housing algorithms are at work, 
the issue of secrecy impacts the algorithm developer, the person who is directly 
affected by the algorithm, and even the public more broadly by perpetuating the 
pernicious effects of discrimination. In both of these contexts, it seems that the 
primary justification for maintaining secrecy is supporting the creative work by 
the algorithm developers—the same reason for providing IP protection under 
the Constitution.275 Otherwise, transparency could mitigate many of these con-
 
272  See All Actions: H.R.2231—116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2231/all-actions?overview=closed 
&KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/H52V-S5LH]. 
273  See H.R. 2231: Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr2231 [https://perma.cc/EB8G-KZ84] (giving 
the bill a 3% chance of being passed). Cathy O’Neil also touts the value of “algorithmic au-
dits,” suggesting that, even “before digging into the software code” it is necessary “to carry 
out research” on the impact of algorithms. O’NEIL, supra note 190, at 208. 
274  See James R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty Go 
Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2013); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1066–67 (2012) (noting the “public conception of crime . . . which is 
reflected in the practices of allowing only government prosecutors, not victims, to prosecute 
defendants and of captioning criminal cases as the government entity against the offender”). 
Professor James Acker has explained: 
Wrongful convictions entail profound social costs in addition to the hardships borne by the un-
fortunate individuals who are erroneously adjudged guilty. When innocents are convicted, the 
guilty go free. Offenders thus remain capable of committing new crimes and exposing untold 
numbers of additional citizens to continuing risk of victimization. Public confidence in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law suffers when justice miscarries. At some point, as cases mount 
and the attendant glare of publicity intensifies, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system and 
the involved actors is jeopardized. Associated monetary costs, paid from public coffers, repre-
sent yet another tangible social consequence of wrongful convictions. 
Acker, supra, at 1631. 
275  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also W. Keith Robinson, 
Economic Theory, Divided Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
1961, 1983 (2015) (“The impetus for intellectual property law is to support individual crea-
tors.”). But see William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: 
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394 (1999) (“The pur-
pose of trade secret protection is fundamentally different from copyright and patent protec-
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cerns. With respect to electronic voting machines, however, even total trans-
parency would not solve the problem. Putting aside electronic voting machine 
manufacturers’ desires to preserve the secrecy of their algorithms in order to 
maintain profits, publicizing these algorithms could actually do more public 
harm than good. Certainly, the risk of inaccuracies that secrecy hides and pro-
tects is problematic, but if would-be hackers were to have access to the algo-
rithms, this could make it even easier for them to hack the machines. In this 
circumstance, they essentially could have a blueprint for successfully hacking 
an election.276 
Addressing the full spectrum of threats that secret algorithms pose in vari-
ous public-interest contexts requires balancing the risks of both secrecy and 
transparency. Algorithm secrecy threatens defendants’ lives and liberty in the 
criminal justice context, equal treatment of persons in the housing arena, and 
the very heart of our democracy where voting is concerned. But algorithm 
transparency also poses threats. Beyond exposure of algorithm-developers’ IP, 
making this secret algorithm information publicly available may pose risks 
such as the threat of election-hackers using voting machine algorithms to fix an 
election. Such risks should also be taken into account in trying to find the prop-
er balance between algorithm secrecy and transparency. 
Balancing the risks of algorithm secrecy and transparency is not an easy 
task. Courts might address each situation individually to create a patchwork of 
remedies using traditional approaches like allowing documents to be filed un-
der seal or even applying more innovative solutions in some circumstances. 
This ad hoc approach could certainly lead to unpredictable results as to when 
algorithms ought to be disclosed, however. Courts might instead take a more 
systemic approach and target the recent changes in IP law that are contributing 
to the swelling secrecy concern. The availability of patents for software is also 
currently unpredictable, but loosening subject matter eligibility restrictions on 
software patents could perhaps improve predictability here, as well as further 
transparency goals. 
A. Patchwork of Remedies 
Examining the risks of secrecy and transparency in each case would allow 
courts to tailor disclosure requirements to the unique facts of individual cases, 
creating a broad patchwork of remedies. Such an ad hoc approach is not foreign 
to judges in the trade secret context. It involves a balancing of interests, with 
judges considering factors such as the relevance of the trade secret, its im-
 
tion; it is, namely, to secure ‘a most fundamental human right, that of privacy, which is 
threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable.’ ” (internal altera-
tions omitted) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974))). 
276  Moreover, the concerns of security probably outweigh the inaccuracy issues, because a 
very high unintentional error rate would likely have to exist to change an election result, 
which is the most important metric in the area of voting. 
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portance to litigation, and the harms that disclosure will cause a litigant or some 
third party.277 
Pursuant to this approach, there are several possibilities for addressing the 
problems of algorithm secrecy, depending on the particular nuances of the case. 
Perhaps the most obvious solution is turning to well-established remedies that 
judges typically employ when issuing protective orders to help safeguard liti-
gants’ trade secrets. 278 Tools that judges might employ here include making the 
algorithm available for in camera examination, or making it available under 
seal. Indeed, these are both typical approaches to dealing with trade secrets in 
various types of litigation.279 When documents are produced for in camera ex-
amination, only the judge has access to the information; the opposing party 
does not.280 Keeping trade secret information closely held in this fashion should 
mitigate algorithm developers’ concerns about the release of trade secret infor-
mation. However, in only very limited circumstances would allowing the 
judge—and no one else—to have access to the information ease the algorithm 
secrecy problem. And in most such cases, the judge would need to make use of 
an independent expert who would also need access to the algorithm at issue. 
Filing documents under seal might be a more practical means by which to place 
a check on secret algorithms. This mechanism of filing under seal means that 
the public will generally not have access to the information even though the 
parties, their attorneys, and the judge will.281 However, there is always the pos-
sibility that these individuals privy to the trade secret information will violate 
 
277  See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking A Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Dis-
closures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 821 (2011) (“The courts consider a wide 
range of factors that are neither definitive nor exhaustive in deciding whether good cause 
exists to grant a protective order.”). 
278  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (stating that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue 
an order to protect a party or person . . . [by] requiring that a trade secret or other confiden-
tial research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in 
a specified way”); Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 356 
(1979) (“The federal courts have long recognized a qualified evidentiary privilege for trade 
secrets and other confidential commercial information.”). 
279  See 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 10.16, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020) 
(“A protective order allowing for in camera proceedings and permitting parties to file rec-
ords under seal may be entered in trade secret cases, so long as the measures taken to main-
tain the integrity of the trade secrets are narrowly tailored to not needlessly encroach upon 
the strong public policy objective of maintaining open courts.”); 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS, 
III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4:20, Westlaw (2d ed. database updated Aug. 
2020) (“Where litigation involves trade secrets the court proceedings may be conducted in 
camera and the court files impounded, so that the litigation does not compromise the trade 
secrets.”); Malla Pollack, Litigating Misappropriation of Trade Secret, in 127 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS § 56, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2020). 
280  See In Camera Inspection, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. Bryan A. Garner, ed., 
2019) (defining “in camera inspection” as “[a] trial judge’s private consideration of evi-
dence”). 
281  See Seal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. Bryan A. Garner, ed., 2019) (defining 
“seal” as “to close up tightly or keep secret” and “[t]o prevent access to (a document, record, 
etc.)”). 
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their obligations and reveal the secret. And once a trade secret is out, it is “lost 
forever.”282 For this reason, algorithm developers may not be entirely comfort-
able with this potential solution to the algorithm secrecy problem. While soft-
ware developers may trust their trade secrets with employees who have signed 
confidentiality and non-competition agreements, they likely will not feel as 
comfortable trusting opposing parties with this information, even if a potential-
ly pilfering party would be subject to contempt orders, sanctions, breach of 
contract claims, or even misappropriation of trade secret claims if the secret got 
out. Success on each of these remedies is often difficult.283 For example, pre-
vailing on a misappropriation claim would generally require the algorithm de-
veloper to establish that the opposing party actually caused the release of the 
trade secret information, and this is often difficult to establish.284 Because of 
these concerns, courts may be less likely to find filing documents under seal or 
ordering in camera examination to tip the scale in the direction of requiring 
transparency. 
In some circumstances, such as in the context of HUD examining possible 
Fair Housing Act violations by Facebook and its algorithms, a government of-
ficial could be charged as a confidant who has access to the trade secret to ex-
amine it for legal, or other, relevance, but who would also be subject to the 
remedies of trade secret law if he inappropriately disclosed the secret infor-
mation. Again, from the algorithm developer’s perspective, divulging trade se-
cret information beyond what is necessary to carry out its business is likely un-
desirable,285 but this may be an acceptable compromise where there is some 
basic showing of, for example, a Fair Housing Act violation. The severity of 
the grounded allegation may justify this required additional limited disclosure 
by the algorithm developer. 
Considering another dimension could very well be relevant in determining 
the appropriate balance to strike between secrecy and transparency and in con-
sidering the variety of remedies that might be available in each context. And 
that is the identity of the primary algorithm users. For example, in the area of 
voting, individual governments are likely the primary users relying on the algo-
rithm developers’ software to accomplish their tasks of conducting elections, 
 
282  FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A trade 
secret once lost is, of course, lost forever.”). 
283  See Rowe, supra note 277, at 801. See generally Margit Livingston, Disobedience and 
Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000) (describing the legal confusions surrounding 
contempt). 
284  See Robert A. Kearney, Why the Burden of Proving Causation Should Shift to the De-
fendant Under the New Federal Trade Secrets Act, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2016) 
(“[C]ausation is difficult to prove and, as it stands, it is too difficult for many misappropria-
tion plaintiffs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
285  See Rowe, supra note 277, at 801 (explaining that “none of these options [for redressing 
a misappropriation claim against the government or its actors] may provide a satisfactory 
remedy, and legal recourse against the government may also be tenuous.”). For a good dis-
cussion of balancing interests in determining whether a company ought to be required to dis-
close a trade secret to the government, see generally id. 
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and this could very well be an important consideration. In the criminal justice 
context, too, it could be relevant if government actors are the primary users of 
tools like breathalyzers and probabilistic genotyping systems.286 In contrast, the 
primary users of Facebook’s software are generally Facebook itself and its pri-
vate advertisers. (In each of these cases, individuals are also users—secondary 
users—when they cast their votes, benefit from a criminal conviction or fight 
against a wrongful one, or answer a housing advertisement on Facebook.) But 
when the government is the primary user, and where total transparency can ad-
dress all but the algorithm developers’ profit concerns, perhaps the government, 
on behalf of the public, could pay a premium to gain access to these trade se-
crets.287 This would probably make the most sense in the criminal justice arena, 
where it is often the government itself making use of these programs to do its 
business of convicting the guilty and freeing the innocent.288 In this context, if 
the government is the primary purchaser or licensor of the product anyway, 
perhaps the developer would not lose much if the government were locked into 
a long-term, exclusive license arrangement with these developers. 
Beyond balancing these and other interests in determining whether and to 
what extent to compel trade secret disclosure, courts have occasionally found 
that certain important public interests—like freedom of expression—can over-
ride trade secret interests and justify full disclosure.289 The Third Restatement 
of Unfair Competition suggests the existence of such a privilege “in connection 
with the disclosure of information that is relevant to public health or safety, or 
to the commission of a crime or tort, or to other matters of substantial public 
concern.”290 Professor Pamela Samuelson offers the example of “a firm [that] 
 
286  Cf. Global Alcohol Breathalyzer and Drug Testing Equipment Market to Reach US$ 
15,790.5 Million by 2027 - Coherent Market Insights, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 13, 2019, 10:37 
AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191213005155/en/Global-Alcohol-Brea 
thalyzer-and-Drug-Testing-Equipment-Market-to-reach-US-15790.5-Million-by-2027---Co 
herent-Market-Insights [https://perma.cc/7GWV-M3GR] (noting that “[t]he Federal Depart-
ments segment held dominant position in the global alcohol breathalyzer and drugs testing 
equipment market in 2018, accounting for 43.8% share in terms of value, followed by pri-
vate sector, hospitals, and rehabilitation centers respectively” and explaining that “[t]he 
growth of the segment is attributed to increasing drug abuse incidences and increasing num-
ber of drunk and drive cases and globally” (emphasis omitted)). 
287  See Ryan, supra note 12, at 341. 
288  Such an arrangement might also work well for voting algorithms, except that the security 
concerns associated with algorithm transparency in this context pose additional difficulties. 
289  Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the 
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 777 (2007) (“On rare occasions, defendants invoke 
the First Amendment as a defense to claims of trade secrecy misappropriation.”). 
290  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995); see also Samuelson, 
supra note 289, at 787–88 (stating that this is a “well-recognized privilege”). The Restate-
ment provides: 
[D]isclosure of another’s trade secret for purposes other than commercial exploitation may im-
plicate the interest in freedom of expression or advance another significant public inter-
est. . . . The existence of a privilege to disclose another’s trade secret depends upon the circum-
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considers certain chemicals used in its manufacturing process to be trade se-
crets, but those chemicals are toxins whose use violates environmental protec-
tion laws.”291 Courts seem to have relied on this exception only rarely, though, 
and it is even rarer that a court would find the privilege outside of the First 
Amendment or whistleblower contexts. When courts do find the privilege ap-
plicable, however, they engage in interest balancing to determine whether these 
important interests outweigh the trade secret interests. 
Ultimately, through a balancing of interests, a variety of traditional, as well 
as more innovative, approaches could be used to deal with the algorithm secre-
cy problem on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, managing trade secrets in litigation 
is nothing new. But judges have generally been hesitant to order any disclosure 
of the algorithms underlying instruments like breathalyzers and other tools that 
can have real impacts on the public interest where the trade secret holder is not 
party to the litigation.292 Moreover, an ad hoc balancing approach ordinarily 
leads to unpredictable results. Accordingly, a more comprehensive solution 
might be desirable here. 
B. The Systemic Intellectual Property Solution 
More effectively addressing the problem of algorithm secrecy requires 
moving beyond the patchwork of remedies growing out of an ad hoc balancing 
approach. Instead, it would be useful to examine the system that has played a 
role in the algorithm secrecy problem: IP law. The recent surge in algorithm 
secrecy has corresponded with shifts in IP jurisprudence over the past several 
years.293 If the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alice and related cases make it 
significantly more difficult to obtain patent protection for software, then it is 
not surprising that software developers now seek to protect their work through 
trade secret law instead.294 Perhaps using the levers of IP law, then, would be a 
useful way to address the legal and policy concerns that the secrecy of algo-
rithms has raised. 
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, excluding software—or even 
basic algorithms—from the realm of patentable subject matter is not expressly 
 
stances of the particular case, including the nature of the information, the purpose of the disclo-
sure, and the means by which the actor acquired the information. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995). 
291  Samuelson, supra note 289, at 788. 
292  See Rowe, supra note 277, at 819–20 (“Even in the private-party discovery disputes, the 
courts are more protective toward permitting discovery of third parties who are not a party to 
the litigation and are far less likely to compel disclosure of their trade secrets.”); Ryan, supra 
note 12, at 307 (“Despite this need for the program information that controls breathalyzers, 
courts have generally refused to grant defendants access to these algorithms and source 
codes.”). 
293  See supra Part I. 
294  See supra Section I.C. 
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required by either the Constitution or the Patent Act.295 Instead, the Constitu-
tion just vests power in Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” by offering patent rights to inventors for their “[d]iscoveries,”296 
and the Patent Act purports to provide protection for “any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”297 Moreover, even the 
House and Senate reports accompanying the passage of § 101 articulated the 
law’s substantial breadth, stating that “anything under the sun that is made by 
man” should be patentable so long as it meets the other requirements of the 
Act.298 Accordingly, the stringent test the Court used in Alice to generally ex-
clude software from patentability not only was a sharp change in law, but it was 
also contrary to the explicit terms of the governing statute and potentially at 
odds with the spirit of the Constitution.299 
The Alice test largely sweeping software outside the bounds of patentabil-
ity was based on policy rather than constitutional or statutory grounds. The 
broad exceptions to § 101 prohibiting the patentability of principles can be 
traced back to the 1852 case of Le Roy v. Tatham,300 where the Court stated 
(without references): “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either 
of them an exclusive right.”301 The Court explained that, where such principles 
are involved, it is “the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natu-
ral agencies” that “constitute the invention”; “the invention is not in discover-
 
295  See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (referring to the ex-
ception as “implicit”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
70 (2012) (“The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit excep-
tion. ‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” (internal 
alterations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))); Ass’n for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (“We have ‘long held 
that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’ ” (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Pro-
metheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. at 70)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978) (“The 
plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. . . . The holding that the discovery of 
th[e] method [in Benson] could not be patented as a ‘process’ forecloses a purely literal read-
ing of § 101.”). 
296  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
297  35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
298  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see also Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (referencing the committee reports). Although 
Congress overhauled the Patent Act with the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011, it 
mostly left the subject matter eligibility question untouched. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (amending various parts of the Patent Act, but, with respect to subject mat-
ter eligibility, providing only that, “no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompass-
ing a human organism”). 
299  Some scholars argue that the Constitution’s language limits Congress to enact only pa-
tent-related laws that further “progress” in the sense that it advances civilization. See Jake 
Linford, Datamining the Meaning(s) of Progress, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1531 (2017). For a 
good summary as to various plausible interpretations of “progress,” see generally id. 
300  Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
301  Id. at 175. 
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ing [the principles], but in applying them to useful objects.”302 Although the 
Court’s discussion about the patentability of principles dates back almost two 
centuries, its discussions about the more specific exception related to algo-
rithms is newer. In the 1939 case of Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. 
Radio Corp. of America,303 the Court alluded to algorithms when explaining 
that, “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not pa-
tentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”304 And it finally specifically addressed 
algorithms in the 1972 Benson case, where it suggested that it would be im-
proper to patent the computer program at issue.305 The concern there was that 
allowing the patent would essentially grant a monopoly on an algorithm, pre-
venting other inventors from building on this basic principle, thereby arresting 
innovation.306 Despite concluding that the program at issue was not patentable, 
however, the Court indicated that perhaps software should be patentable but 
that this is “a policy matter to which [the Court is] not competent to speak.”307 
This nuance seems to have been lost when the Court decided Parker six years 
later.308 When the Court subsequently decided Diehr in 1981, it clarified that, 
although the policy decision that algorithms are unpatentable stood, that did not 
mean that inventions based on algorithms could not be patented.309 The Court 
 
302  Id. 
303  Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
304  Id. at 94. 
305  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). The Gottschalk Court explained: 
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if 
the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. 
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in con-
nection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent 
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on 
the algorithm itself. 
Id. 
306  See id. at 67–68, 71 (reciting precedent providing that one should not be granted a legal 
monopoly on an idea and stating that “in practical effect [the patenting of an idea] would be 
the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented 
in this case.”). 
307  Id. at 72 (“It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a 
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak. The President’s Commission on the 
Patent System rejected the proposal that these programs be patentable . . . .” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
308  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, we held that 
the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not be patented.” (internal 
citation omitted)). But cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has un-
doubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statuto-
ry terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”). 
309  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (reciting the notion that ideas and principles are not patenta-
ble, explaining that the Court’s precedents “stand for no more than these long-established 
principles,” and stating that the invention at issue is patentable even though, “in several steps 
of the process[,] a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used”). 
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thus delimited the policy exception, finding that, so long as an algorithm were 
paired with a physical step—even one already known in the art—the invention 
was patent-eligible.310 The Alice Court broadened the policy exception, howev-
er, making it much more difficult to patent algorithm-based inventions. 
Today, where software touches basically every facet of life, IP policy 
considerations should be viewed more broadly. Courts should look beyond the 
basic trade-offs of the innovation incentive created by a limited monopoly 
versus the costs to innovation when preventing another from building on 
existing principles311 and consider the secrecy consequences of generally 
sweeping software outside the boundaries of patentability. Essentially closing 
off this avenue to inventors creates almost an entire industry of secrecy that 
affects and potentially negatively impacts the public interest. Secrecy can 
undermine trust in our criminal justice system. It can allow unfair biases to 
flourish in our society. And it can erode the trust in our government that is 
essential to a functioning democracy. When engaging in a decision about the 
scope of subject matter eligibility, these broader policy considerations should 
also be deemed relevant.312 
For example, when determining the patentability of software powering a 
probabilistic genotyping system used to convict criminals, a decisionmaker—
whether that be the PTO or a court—might take into account considerations 
beyond just the extent to which issuing a software patent might stifle 
innovation by effectively preempting use of the underlying algorithm. This 
narrow focus on stifling innovation was of course the concern behind Alice’s 
less-than-clear test concentrating on whether the combination of claims 
includes an “inventive concept.”313 This test has left a wake of uncertainty 
about where exactly the line between patent eligibility and non-eligibility lies. 
Within this area of uncertainy, decisionmakers might also consider the 
consequences of the inventor turning to trade secret law to protect his 
invention. In this example, where the software is used to convict criminals, a 
lack of transparency and the shield of trade secret law could have devastating 
effects, such as wrongfully convicting an innocent person.314 And the 
disadvantages of finding subject matter eligiblity for the software could very 
well pale in comparison. This balancing might mirror some of the balancing 
that takes place when courts determine whether and under which conditions a 
party must disclose a trade secret.315 It might also reflect the balancing that 
 
310  See id. at 184; see also supra text accompanying note 99. 
311  See supra text accompanying notes 305–306. 
312  As Thomas Jefferson suggested, “the exclusive right to invention [is] . . . for the benefit 
of society.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 
eds., 1903). 
313  Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217, 221 (2014); supra text accompanying 
note 140. 
314  See supra Section II.A. 
315  See supra text accompanying notes 277–79. 
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courts occasionally engage in when determining whether the secrecy of trade 
secret law must yield to First Amendment or whistleblower concerns.316 But 
when the balancing takes place under the umbrella of patent eligibility, at least 
the property owner potentially receives something in return for disclosure: a 
twenty-year patent. 
Certainly, a more lenient approach to subject matter eligibility for patents 
would not be a cure-all for harms created by software secrecy. Depending on 
the nature of the invention, the would-be patentee might continue to prefer 
trade secret protection over patent protection.317 But, as in other areas of law,318 
patent law can affect individuals’ decisions. It can be used to nudge inventors 
toward transparency when that decision will better serve the public interest. 
Ultimately, assessing the potentially negative effects from narrowly construing 
patent eligibility could push courts back in the more patent-permissive direction 
of Diehr and the Federal Circuit cases suggesting that the software industry is 
not largely excluded from successfully pursuing patents on their inventions. 
And this would likely induce at least some software inventors to pursue patent 
protection rather than trade secret protection, thus increasing transparency. 
The Constitution focuses on promoting “[p]rogress” through science and 
the arts,319 and transparency is key to such progress.320 Not only is transparency 
important so other would-be innovators can build upon one’s inventions, but it 
is also key to ensuring that an invention is truly useful—in the case of 
breathalyzers, for example, that it provides accurate results. While the 
usefulness, or utility, requirement of § 101 is ordinarily not stringently applied 
 
316  See Sandeen & Mylly, supra note 31, at 42; see also Samuelson, supra note 289, at 839–
40 (2007) (suggesting that certain factors set out in case law “will obviously play out differ-
ently in varying factual contexts, but they provide a sound mechanism for balancing the First 
Amendment interests of journalists and publishers and those of trade secret claimants in 
weighing whether confidential source information should be disclosed to trade secret claim-
ants”). 
317  See supra text accompanying notes 36–44. 
318  See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 
373, 397 (1994) (“Federal income tax law promotes home ownership in a number of ways, 
the most notable being the allowance of a deduction for home mortgage interest.”). Indeed, 
before the Court found it to be a First Amendment violation, Congress required deci-
sionmakers to consider the effects of negative words on the general public by prohibiting 
disparaging trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 
1765 (2017) (“[W]e hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment.”). 
319  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
320  Indeed, the majority of scholars believe that “progress” means further advancing 
knowledge. See Linford, supra note 299, at 1545 (“[M]ost scholars have embraced a series 
of meanings that coalesce around the notion that progress means advancement in 
knowledge, using phrases like ‘the encouragement of learning’ to refine the concept.” (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 150–51 (2002))). 
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to limit patent eligibility,321 § 101’s focus on promoting “new and useful” 
inventions highlights how the transparency of patents can further usefulness, 
and thus “[pr]ogress,” through science and the arts.322 Rather than sharply 
limiting patents on software powering instruments ranging from breathalyzers 
to electronic voting machines, returning to a more generous and workable 
standard for software that acknowledges secrecy’s impact on the public interest 
would further progress in this field and benefit the public interest by fostering 
greater transparency where important considerations like equality, life, and 
liberty are at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice significantly curtailed sub-
ject matter eligibility for patents. This involved exempting from patent protec-
tion an overwhelming swath of software that was previously patentable. Mak-
ing it more difficult to patent software has pushed at least some developers to 
protect their intellectual property through trade secrets instead. This has result-
ed in considerable secrecy now cloaking the workings and uses of numerous 
software offerings and their underlying algorithms. Many of these algorithms 
affect the public interest, but the secrecy shrouding them has made it close to 
impossible to assess whether the algorithms suffer from risks related to inaccu-
racies, biases, or security flaws. And the devastating effects of inaccurate, bi-
ased, or insecure algorithms and software are heightened in the public interest 
realm, leading to severe effects such as wrongful convictions, ubiquitous biases 
in housing, and undermining the sacred act of voting in a democracy. One 
might address these concerns in a patchwork manner by balancing the secrecy 
and transparency risks in each unique situation. But attacking one source of the 
secrecy problem—recent changes in IP law—could effectively address the mat-
ter in a more global fashion. The Alice Court’s shift in doctrine was not driven 
by the Constitution or even the terms of the governing statute. Instead, policy 
concerns drove the Court’s decision. Yet the Court neglected to examine the 
significant impact that propelling software and algorithm developers toward 
secrecy would have on the public interest overall. These effects should have 
 
321  See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 
(2011) (“In the broad scheme of things, . . . the requirement that an invention be useful has 
been nearly nonexistent—essentially ignored. The level of ‘utility’ an applicant must cur-
rently demonstrate to obtain a patent is extremely low: the invention need only operate as 
described and potentially provide some de minimis public benefit.” (footnote omitted)). But 
cf. Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (2014) (argu-
ing that characterizing the usefulness requirement as de minimis is inaccurate and stating 
that “[i]t is more correct to say that the utility threshold is decidedly biased—a de minimis 
threshold for some inventions but a considerably more stringent one for others” (emphasis 
omitted)). Note that some experts suggest that utility is only part of the usefulness require-
ment. See Risch, supra, at 58–59 (arguing that § 101’s “utility requirement (as currently in-
terpreted) is only a part of an invention’s usefulness”). 
322  See supra note 320. 
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moved the Court in Alice, and these effects should influence the Court in re-
shaping subject matter eligibility for patents going forward. 
